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ABSTRACT
Previous research has shown that anxiety-disordered 
subjects attend to information directly relevant to their 
area of concern. In this study, it was postulated that 
cardiac-related stimuli would have attention capturing 
characteristics for individuals with no psychiatric history 
but who had recently experienced a myocardial infarction 
(MI). To study this hypothesis, MI subjects (n=34) and 
matched controls (n=31) participated in an attentional 
search task. MI subjects showed slower reaction times (RT) 
for both cardiac and socially threatening distractors 
compared to RT when neutral distractors were present. For 
both MI and control subjects distress level was associated 
with increased interference from socially threatening 
distractors. For control subjects only, reported level of 
cardiac concern was associated with RT speeding when 
cardiac distractors were present. In a second stage of 
this experiment, half of the subjects were instructed to 
suppress thoughts of an MI while the remaining subjects 
were instructed to think of anything. Contrary to 
prediction, subjects who suppressed thoughts of an MI did 
not show increased interference from cardiac distractors in 
a subsequent attentional search task.
INTRODUCTION
Myocardial infarction (MI) is defined as the death of 
heart tissue resultant from oxygen deprivation. The 
American Heart Association (1987) estimates that each year 
approximately 1,500,000 individuals experience an MI and, 
one quarter of all U.S. deaths are due to MI. The current 
death rate, however, is declining because improved medical 
technology has led to increased survival rates (Pasternak, 
Braunwald, & Sobel, 1988).
For those who survive, the MI experience presents 
psychological as well as physical consequences. Adverse 
emotional reactions to MI are associated with poorer 
recovery as shown by decreased levels of return to work, 
poorer sexual functioning, and diminished ability to enjoy 
life (Maeland & Havik, 1987). However, much variability 
exists in the types of psychological reactions that post-MI 
patients evince, and these reactions seem only weakly 
related to actual infarction severity (Mayou, 1984; 
Trelawny-Ross & Russell, 1987). Therefore, understanding 
differential psychological responses to such a major 
stressor is of both practical significance and theoretical 
interest. Possible explanations for differential MI 
responses include pre-existing individual differences, 
different coping responses, or some interaction between 
personality and coping. The aim of this study is to 
investigate how an MI impacts the processing of threatening
1
2information, and how specific coping strategies may- 
moderate stressor influence.
Coping responses to a stressor frequently have been 
discussed in terms of either attending to or avoiding 
information relevant to the stressor (Roth & Cohen, 1986; 
Suls & Fletcher, 1985). However, researchers typically 
have measured attention/avoidance with self-report measures 
of coping style. In this study non-self report measures of 
attentional or avoidant strategies were assessed by using 
information processing paradigms.
The intent of this study was twofold: to investigate 
attentional reactions of individuals who experienced an MI 
and to investigate the effect strategic avoidance of 
cardiac-related stimuli had on attentional deployment. To 
address the first research question, patients who 
experienced an MI were asked to participate in a 
computerized attentional search task modeled after 
paradigms employed by Broadbent, Broadbent, and Jones
(1986) and Mathews, May, Mogg, and Eysenck (1990).
Subjects were asked to respond to a target word accompanied 
by other distracting words. The main prediction of this 
study was that reaction times for post-MI subjects, as 
compared with responses of age-matched controls, would be 
longer when cardiac-related distractors were present.
Longer response latencies were assumed to be a function of
3the attention-capturing properties of the distracting 
stimuli.
The second question addressed by this study was the 
potential attentional consequences of intentionally 
suppressing stress-related thoughts. To address this 
issue, it was necessary to create a situation where the 
subject would suppress certain thoughts. Specifically, 
some subjects were asked to not think about anything 
related to heart disease. Other subjects were instructed 
to think of anything at all. After this manipulation, 
subjects repeated the attentional deployment task 
previously described. It was predicted that response 
latencies when cardiac-related distractors were present 
would be longer for subjects required to suppress heart- 
related thoughts. This prediction was based on the 
hypothesis that actively avoiding heart-related information 
would paradoxically increase attention directed to cardiac 
stimuli.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Psychological Reactions to an MI
Emotional responses to an MI. It is generally 
believed that following an MI, patients frequently 
experience some degree of psychological distress (Sykes, 
Evans, Boyle, Mcllmoyle, & Salathia, 1989). Given the 
presumed stressful nature of experiencing an MI and its 
potential disorganizing effect on behavior, a number of 
studies have investigated both short- and long-term anxiety 
responses in post-MI patients. However, research in this 
area has not been able to consistently identify a universal 
stress reaction in individuals who have experienced a heart 
attack.
An early study by Hackett and Cassem (1976) found when 
psychiatric rating scales were used to assess anxiety 
approximately 50% of post MI subjects experienced at least 
moderate levels of anxiety. The results of other research 
using clinical ratings of anxiety have shown varied 
outcomes. The number of patients judged to be exhibiting 
an anxious response have ranged from 19% to 85% (Cay, 
Vetter, Philip & Dugard, 1972; Havik & Maeland, 1990;
Mayou, Williamson, & Foster, 1978; Stern, Caplan, & Cassem, 
1987).
The techniques used in these studies share the same 
methodological flaws. First of all, using clinician rating 
scales results in subjective judgments about what
4
5constitutes an anxiety reaction, and standardization 
procedures were not conducted on clinical rating scales. 
Additional problems included lack of data on the types of 
reactions experienced by relevant control groups such as 
other hospitalized patient groups. This latter problem 
resulted in the inability to distinguish between an anxiety 
reaction based on the MI as a stressor versus 
hospitalization as the sole stressor.
Some studies have attempted to address these problems 
by using standardized measures of anxiety such as the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch,
& Luchene, 1970) and comparing the responses of MI patients 
to those of other illness populations. The findings from 
the majority of these studies suggest that immediately 
following an MI, anxiety scores are elevated significantly 
when compared with a normative sample (Pancheri,
Bellaterra, Matteoli, Cristofari, Polizze, & Puletti, 1978; 
Sykes, et al., 1989; Thompson, Webster, Cordle, & Sutton, 
1987). However, in absolute terms the anxiety scores of 
the cardiac group were not much higher than those of the 
normative control group. In addition, when scores of 
cardiac patients were compared with a control group of 
other medical patients, no anxiety score differences were 
found (Sykes, et al., 1989; Vetter, Cay, Philip, & Strange,
1 977 ) .
6Results from studies using standardized instruments 
suggest that, as a group, MI patients experience a small 
but significant increase in anxiety. This increase, 
however, is no greater than the increase in anxiety scores 
found in individuals hospitalized with other medical 
illnesses. One problem with drawing any definitive 
conclusions from this body of research is that all of these 
studies used between-subject designs. Since it would be 
very difficult to measure psychological state both before 
and after an MI, no pre-post studies have been reported.
The implication of this methodological problem is that the 
types of post-MI emotional changes can only be inferred.
One type of study using within-subject procedures 
measures a patient's emotional state for a period of time 
following MI. These studies suggest MI patients do 
experience psychological distress immediately following a 
heart attack, and the distress lasts at least six months. 
During hospitalization, anxiety levels seem highest 
immediately after a heart attack and diminish somewhat with 
admission to a coronary care unit (Vetter, et al., 1977). 
However, when the individual is transferred to a general 
medical ward, anxiety increases significantly. A steady 
decrease in anxiety level occurs throughout the 
individual's stay in the general medical ward, but a slight 
elevation occurs immediately before discharge (Philip, Cay, 
Vetter, & Stuckey, 1979; Thompson et al., 1987).
Investigators postulated that increases in anxiety are due 
to concerns that future cardiac complications may occur 
when medical services are not at hand.
Investigations of long-term emotional reactions 
indicate that elevated anxiety levels exist for at least 
six months. In one study using the STAI, Thompson et al.
(1987) found equally high state anxiety scores on day one 
and at six weeks after the MI. At one year, however, state 
anxiety scores decreased, suggesting that patients no 
longer experienced significant emotional distress. Havik 
and Maeland (1990) reported similar findings using a 
semantic differential type rating scale to assess anxiety 
levels. These researchers found that after six weeks, 
ratings for depression decreased, but anxiety levels had 
not changed at a six-month follow-up. In sum, data from 
longitudinal studies suggest that most individuals 
experience increased anxiety following an MI, and this 
emotional distress may last for at least six months.
Content of post-MI worry. Although a number of 
studies have attempted to measure the degree of emotional 
distress cardiac patients experience, only a few studies 
have attempted to identify specific cognitions co-occurring 
with the emotional distress. In a longitudinal study, 
Thompson et al. (1987) required subjects to rate the amount 
of concern the MI produced. In this study, subjects rated 
thoughts associated with the cardiac event itself as the
8most anxiety producing cognition, followed by concerns of 
future cardiac functioning. When measured across time, 
fluctuations of reported frequency of these concerns were 
congruent with STAI measures of state anxiety.
In another study, Wiklund, Sanne, Vedin, and 
Wilhelmsson (1984) measured specific sources of worry in 
post Ml-patients. Measures in this study were taken two 
months and one year after the MI. Two months after the 
cardiac event, 81% of 131 post-MI respondents reported 
frequent worry about heart disease, 82% stated that 
thoughts of their cardiac state produced worry and anxiety, 
and 74% stated that they worried about future cardiac 
functioning. When re-assessed ten months later, 
respondents reported significant decreases in time spent 
thinking and worrying about the MI.
One possible reason for the limited data on sources of 
post-MI worry is that researchers may assume concern 
regarding future functioning will almost universally create 
emotional distress. A review of the available studies 
suggests this is indeed the case, with the vast majority of 
MI patients reporting at least some disturbing thoughts 
regarding the cardiac experience. In addition, these 
thoughts appear to co-occur with feelings of anxiety and 
may in fact be the individual's source of apprehension.
Individual differences in emotional reactions.
Although most individuals experience at least some
emotional distress following an MI, psychological responses 
vary greatly and appear only marginally related to MI 
severity (Mayou, 1984). Research into individual 
differences has focused primarily on coping styles to 
explain variance in emotional reactions. Although much has 
been written concerning ways patients cope with illness, 
studies investigating coping styles of MI patients have 
centered almost exclusively on denial in these patients 
(Havik & Maeland, 1988).
Early studies of denial in MI patients indicate that 
deniers either show lower levels of anxiety and depression 
when compared to non-deniers or show a more rapid decrease 
in anxiety (Billing Lindell, Sederholm, & Theorell, 1980; 
Froese, Hackett, Cassem, & Silverberg, 1974; Hackett & 
Cassem, 1974). In these studies investigators defined 
denial as the conscious or unconscious denial of all or 
part of meaning associated with illness and measured this 
construct with a self-report denial scale. Subjects were 
divided into either deniers or non-deniers based on their 
responses. More recent investigations treat denial as a 
multi-dimensional construct. Questionnaires measuring 
denial were broken down via principal components analysis 
into three factors: denial of illness, denial of impact,
and suppression. Results from later studies indicate that 
denial of impact, as opposed to denial of illness, is
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associated with better psychological functioning following 
an MI (Havik & Maelands, 1988).
Currently, a scarcity of literature exists concerning 
MI coping reactions. Current data suggest that denying the 
impact an MI will have on future functioning may result in 
better short-term psychological adjustment. Although the 
literature alluded to potential long-term problems 
associated with denial, no empirical investigations have 
taken place.
Coping Reactions
Although little research has been conducted on cardiac 
patients' coping styles, a relatively large body of 
literature is available for a general discussion of coping 
styles. As previously mentioned, the various discussions 
of coping have categorized coping strategies either as an 
avoidant process or as a strategy where individuals focus 
on the stressor. A variety of terms describe an avoidant 
strategy for dealing with stressful information. These 
terms include "blunting, attenuation, denial, distraction, 
repression, and suppression". Although these terms refer 
to different behaviors, they all emphasize focusing 
attention away from a stressor. The antithesis to avoidant 
strategies involve focusing attention toward the stressor. 
Likewise, there are a number of terms (eg., "monitoring, 
augmentation, sensitization, and vigilance") that reflect 
an attentive coping style (Suls & Fletcher, 1984).
Investigators for this study are interested in the 
coping style literature because it has emphasized the role 
of attention in responding to threat- It is interesting to 
note that although attentional deployment remains central 
to discussions of coping, attention, per se, is not 
measured. Instead, researchers have relied on self-report 
measures designed to assess vigilance. For example, two 
conceptualizations of coping strategies are repression - 
sensitization (Bell & Byrne, 1978) and monitoring - 
blunting (Miller, 1980). In the case of repression - 
sensitization, coping style is measured with a MMPI 
subscale, and for monitoring - blunting, coping style is 
assessed using a hypothetical behavioral preference test. 
Although each of these coping styles focus on the concept 
of attention/avoidance, measures of attention to a 
threatening cue are not taken.
Another important question addressed in the coping 
style literature is whether individuals react differently 
to stress (eg., some individuals attend to stressor and 
others avoid it), or if all individuals show similar 
response patterns. In other words, are there individual 
differences in coping reactions, or is coping better 
described as a universal process allowing for individual 
variation in intensity and duration? Their is some 
empirical support for the individual difference hypothesis 
(ie., some individuals attend to stress-related
information, and others avoid it) (Bell & Byrne, 1978; 
Miller, 1980; 1987). However, it is possible these 
individual differences are a function of the methods used 
to measure attention and avoidance and may not reflect how 
people respond to stress. For example, the Miller 
Behavioral Style Scale (MBSS) requires subjects to choose a 
behavioral style they would adopt in a series of stressful 
situations. Although the data suggests this scale has 
adequate reliability and discriminant validity (Miller, 
1987; Miller & Managan, 1983), this measure may simply 
assess preferred behavioral style rather than actual coping 
style. Therefore, it is possible that all individuals 
would show the same attentional bias toward a stressor 
although some individuals prefer to avoid it. If this 
scenario is correct, the measure of coping style would 
merely measure behavioral preference. Individual 
differences in actual attentional processes may or may not 
be present when the individual is exposed to stressful 
stimuli.
A related but slightly different unaddressed question 
is whether coping style is an automatic or strategic 
process. Since coping style has been frequently presented 
as a personality variable, there may be an implicit 
assumption that attention/avoidance to a stressor is 
somewhat automatized. However, methods used to measure 
coping (eg., preferred behavioral style) also suggest
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researchers believe some volitional control is involved. 
When considered from an information processing perspective, 
coping style may be both an automatic and a strategic 
process. More automatic processes associated with initial 
attention may occur at an early stage of processing, while 
during later stages the individual may choose to continue 
attending to the stimuli or may take behavioral or 
cognitive actions to avoid it. In other words, although 
initial attentional reactions may be automatic, volitional 
strategies may override these initial reactions once 
controlled processes are activated.
The relationship between actual attentional strategies 
and coping style as measured with self-report measures is 
unknown. Miller (1980; 1987) argues that some individuals 
(monitors) will attend to threatening information, while 
others (blunters) will avoid these cues. However, these 
discussions of coping style do not identify the 
hypothesized processing stage that attention/avoidance 
occurs. Since scales such as the MBSS seem to measure 
volitional strategies, it is likely that monitoring/ 
blunting takes place during later processing stages. 
Consequently, the relationship between vigilance as 
measured by self-report methods and selective attention as 
defined from an information processing perspective is 
unknown. For example, blunters may show a greater 
attentional bias to stressor-related stimuli. This
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seemingly paradoxical effect could occur if the process of 
actively trying to avoid certain information makes that 
information more emotional and thus attracts more attention 
in the future. A more complete discussion of the 
relationship between strategic avoidance and attention will 
be presented in later sections.
A final question of practical and theoretical 
importance is determining which coping strategy is best.
The current data suggest the answer depends on the type of 
stressor and the amount of time the stressor will be 
present. In a meta-analysis of the relative efficacy of 
coping styles, Suls and Fletcher (1985) conclude that for 
short-term adaption, instructions to either attend to or 
avoid a stressful stimuli produce better coping responses 
than no instructions at all. However, attention to 
stressful stimuli is effective only if attention is 
directed toward sensory (as opposed to emotional) aspects 
of the stressor. If subjects instructed to attend were not 
provided with a non-emotional attentional strategy or were 
told to attend to the emotional aspects of the stressor, 
short-term adaptation was significantly poorer than for 
subjects who avoided. For example, Leventhal, Brown, 
Shacham, and Enquist (1979) found when subjects who placed 
their hand in ice cold water were instructed to attend to 
objective aspects of the discomfort (ie., the temperature 
of the water), they reported less distress than subjects
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who were distracted from the stressor. However, if the 
subjects were told to attend to the emotional consequences 
of the stressor, they reported more distress than the 
distractors. In contrast to the results of short-term 
studies, there was modest support for the hypothesis that 
attentional strategies are more efficacious than avoidance 
in long-term adaptation (Suls & Fletcher, 1985).
A problem plaguing the conclusions of this research is 
its ambiguity as to how subjects actually responded to the 
stressor. Possibly, subjects attended to some features of 
the stressor and avoided other aspects regardless of 
instruction. An alternative to the self-report approach is 
to use information-processing paradigms to study reactions 
to stress. These techniques provide a more direct, less 
subjective assessment of attentional style.
Information Processing Approach to Attention
Researchers in the area of emotional disorders, 
particularly anxiety, have also studied issues associated 
with attentional styles. The basic hypothesis underlying 
experimentation in this area purports anxious individuals 
show an attentional bias toward threat-related material 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). A large body of research 
currently exists showing individuals diagnosed with an 
anxiety disorder attend to threatening material to a 
greater degree than normal controls.
Experimental methods. Of interest to this study are 
not only the research findings but also the experimental 
procedures used to test the attentional bias hypothesis. 
Specifically, the conclusions of this research have been 
based mainly on studies using information-processing 
methodology borrowed from basic cognitive science. The 
measures used fall into two basic categories: those
measuring attentional capture characteristics of the 
stimuli and those in which attentional bias is inferred 
from interference of performance. Using the former method, 
attention has been measured by presenting subjects with two 
words in different areas of a Video Display Unit (VDU). 
Immediately following presentation of the two words, a 
probe (usually a dot) appears behind one of the words and 
subjects must respond to the location of the probe (this 
technique is known as the attention probe method). If 
response time latencies are faster for one particular type 
of word, it is believed that this enhancement in 
performance is due to attention capturing properties of 
that word type (MacLeod et al., 1986). Examples of tasks 
in which attentional bias is inferred from slower reaction 
times include versions of the Stroop interference paradigm 
and attentional search measures (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; 
Mathews, et al., 1990). In the attentional search 
paradigms, subjects are presented with three words: one 
target word and two distracting words. Subjects are
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instructed to ignore the distracting words and respond to 
the target word by pressing the appropriate key. If 
reaction times are slower when threatening words are 
present, it is inferred the delay is due to attentional 
capture by the threatening stimuli.
Explanations other than attentional bias can explain 
performance interference in the Stroop and attentional 
search paradigms. For example, the decrement in reaction 
time could be due to heightened negative affect resulting 
from exposure to threatening words. While alternative 
explanations cannot be ruled out, similarities between the 
results of interference paradigms and the attention probe 
paradigms argue the most parsimonious conclusion is that 
interference effects are a function of attentional bias 
(Mathews, 1993).
Specificity of threat. The basic finding that anxious 
individuals attend to threatening information has been 
replicated in a number of studies (see Mathews, 1990 for a 
review). Although initial investigations showed a general 
attentional bias to all threatening information (MacLeod et 
al., 1986), the results of later studies suggest 
attentional biases occur in response to specific areas of 
concern. Using the Stroop paradigm, interference effects 
specific to an individual's area of concern are found for 
PTSD subjects (McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990), 
panic patients (Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988;
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McNally, Riemann, & Kim, 1990) and spider phobics (Watts, 
McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986). In addition, Mogg, 
Mathews, and Weinman (1989) found that anxious patients who 
reported worrying about illness showed greater interference 
to physically threatening words than subjects who reported 
more social concerns. Therefore, evidence from a number of 
studies suggests attention is captured by threat 
information directly relevant to the individual's area of 
concern.
With respect to this current study, whether or not 
post-MI patients show an attentional bias toward threat- 
related material is currently unknown. Also unknown is 
whether or not an individual will attend to all threatening 
stimuli or solely information related to the trauma, if an 
attentional bias is found. It is plausible the emotional 
distress caused by a life threatening experience could 
result in a generalized bias to all threatening 
information. However, current research suggests the 
putative bias will be directed toward information closely 
related to the stressor.
State vs. trait effects. Although anxious individuals 
do show attentional biases, it remains unclear whether this 
bias is a function of the individual's mood state, 
particular characteristics associated with people who 
develop anxiety disorders, or a combination of state and 
trait effects. Research comparing currently anxious and
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recovered patients has generally found that attentional 
biases tend to dissipate upon successful treatment (Foa & 
McNally, 1986; Watts, et al., 1986). This finding 
emphasizes the role of negative mood state and worry in 
attentional bias, and de-emphasizes the importance of trait 
characteristics. However, in one longitudinal study 
investigating high- and low-trait anxious student's 
responses to stress, only high-trait subjects showed 
attentional bias during the stress. Specifically, MacLeod 
and Mathews (1988) found no differences between high- and 
low-trait students using a measure of attentional bias at 
the beginning of a semester. When these same students were 
tested during an examination period, high-trait but not 
low-trait students showed an attentional bias to exam- 
related stimuli. This difference occurred although both 
groups reported increases in anxiety during the examination 
period. MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) also found that 
high-trait anxious subjects attended to exam-related 
stimuli, but only when cues were presented at a subliminal 
level.
Presently, no definitive conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the importance of trait anxiety characteristics 
in the development of attentional biases to threatening 
information. One possible conclusion is that high-trait 
anxious individuals have cognitive characteristics such 
that the experience of a stressful event results in these
20
individuals attending to information relevant to the 
stressor. Conversely, low-trait individuals may actually 
show an avoidance of threatening stimuli. However, because 
no study has varied severity of the stressor, the way that 
high- and low-trait subjects respond to various degrees of 
stress is unknown. For example, low-level chronic stress 
(such as taking an exam) may only result in cognitive 
biases for individuals predisposed to behave anxiously.
The attentional response to a major stressor (such as an 
MI), however, may prove similar for both high- and low- 
trait subjects.
Automatic vs controlled processes. Issues of 
automaticity in cognitive biases have been investigated 
with paradigms using dichotic listening tasks and 
subliminal presentation of visual stimuli on interference 
tasks. In both types of studies, anxious subjects 
exhibited greater performance interference when threatening 
or personally relevant information was presented as a 
distractor (Bargh, 1982; Mathews & MacLeod, 1986; Mathews, 
1993). This interference occurred in spite of subjects' 
inability to identify the threatening stimuli. Because 
interference seems to have occurred without complete 
awareness of threatening information, these findings are 
used as evidence that attentional capture occurs in an 
automatic rather than a controlled fashion. The
finding that threatening information can result in
attentional bias even without awareness of that information 
seems somewhat illogical. Imagining how threatening words 
can cause interference before the subject is aware of the 
word is difficult. Attempts to explain this problem 
suggest awareness is not a dichotic phenomenon (aware vs. 
unaware), but rather a continuous one. On one end of the 
continuum a stimuli may be objectively presented, but the 
subject is unable to report the content of the stimuli.
The subject, however, is able to correctly identify that 
some type of information was presented, and some aspects of 
the stimuli, such as basic emotional characteristics, may 
be processed. At the other end of the continuum is 
complete subjective awareness where subjects are able to 
report content of the stimuli. The current data suggest 
attentional biasing most likely occurs during early stages 
of awareness (Mathews, 1993). Although subjects cannot 
report the semantic nature of the information, the 
emotional features of the stimuli (threatening vs. non­
threatening) still may be processed, leading to an 
attentional bias.
If this line of theorizing is correct, then 
attentional biases may be more automatic than strategic. 
However, it also is possible that strategic processes 
occurring at later stages of processing can in turn affect 
attentional processes. This seemingly paradoxical effect 
could occur if certain strategies increased the saliency or
emotionality of threatening stimuli. For example, 
strategic acts of avoidance may increase the salience of 
the topic by pairing the information with distracting 
stimuli. Research has shown that cue salience augmentation 
is associated with increased attentional allocation to that 
cue (Lavy & van den Hout, in press). Another potential 
manner avoidance could cause increased attentional bias is 
through increasing the emotionality of the stimuli.
Consider an example where an individual attempts to 
suppress thoughts of the threatening topic. If suppression 
attempts prove unsuccessful, then emotional aspects of the 
material may increase because of the failure experience or 
because the attempts to suppress increased the frequency 
the threatening thought.
Thought Suppression
Recent endeavors have been made to experimentally 
study avoidant coping strategies by requesting that 
subjects not think about certain topics (eg. Clark, Ball, & 
Pape, 1991; Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Wegner, Schneider, 
Carter, & White 1987). In these experiments on thought 
suppression, subjects typically are presented with a 
concept or story and are requested not to think about that 
topic for an allocated time. A consistent finding of this 
research is that the suppression manipulation actually has 
the paradoxical effect of increasing thoughts associated 
with the forbidden topic.
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This paradoxical effect was originally demonstrated by 
Wegner and his colleagues (Wegner, et al., 1987). In these 
studies, subjects were asked to either express or suppress 
thoughts of a given topic (eg., a white bear). In the 
second phase of the experiment, subjects who initially 
suppressed the topic then were asked to intentionally think 
about it, while those who initially expressed the topic 
were asked to suppress it. During both suppression and 
expression periods, subjects were requested to ring a bell 
when thoughts of the topic came to mind. Using this 
design, Wegner et al. (1987) found subjects reported 
significantly more thoughts of a topic if the expression 
period followed the suppression period. Similar effects 
were found in other studies using slightly different 
methods (Clark, et al., 1991; Lavy & van den Hout, 1990).
This research is significant to the current study 
because the thought suppression paradigm may provide a 
technique to investigate potential cognitive biases 
occurring because of avoidant coping strategies. Of 
particular interest to this study is determining whether 
certain avoidant techniques, such as suppression, result in 
increased attentional allocation to the suppressed topic. 
Although only one study has addressed this issue (Lavy & 
van den Hout, in press), results from other research may 
offer insight into potential mechanisms accounting for how
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suppression could lead to increased attention directed 
toward the suppressed material.
Thought suppression and emotion. One potential manner 
whereby suppression could lead to increased attention is 
through increasing the emotionality of the suppressed 
thought and/or increasing the distress caused by the 
suppressor. The studies investigating the relationship 
between suppression and mood fall into two categories: 
those measuring autonomic indices of suppression and those 
investigating suppression in an emotionally distressed 
population.
Wegner, Shortt, Blake, and Page (1990) originally 
addressed the question of whether increased autonomic 
activity occurs during suppression. In a series of 
studies, Wegner and his colleagues measured changes in skin 
conductance during expression and suppression of both 
exciting and unexciting thoughts. In the initial 
investigation, subjects both expressed and suppressed 
thoughts of sex, dancing, parents, and school 
administrators for a period of three minutes each. Sex was 
considered the exciting thought, while the other topics 
were viewed as unexciting. These researchers found that 
skin conductance levels during both suppression and 
expression of sexual thoughts differed from every other 
condition. In other words, both suppressing and expressing 
thoughts of unexciting topics failed to produce changes in
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skin conductance when compared to each other or to 
baseline. Conversely, when subjects expressed and 
suppressed thoughts of sex, measures of skin conductance 
differed significantly from baseline and from unexciting 
topics. No differences in skin conductance levels were 
found between the suppression of sex and the expression of 
sex.
In a follow-up study presented in the same article 
(Wegner et al., 1990), subjects either suppressed thoughts 
of sex and expressed thoughts of weather or expressed 
thoughts of weather and suppressed thoughts of sex. The 
suppression and expression conditions each lasted for 30 
minutes, resulting in one hour of monitoring for each 
subject. During all periods, the researchers required 
subjects to report thought content while skin conductance 
measures were taken. Correlations coefficients were 
calculated within each minute across the 30 minute 
intervals between the number of mentions of the topic (sex 
or weather) and changes in skin conductance levels. A 
significant relationship between thoughts of the topic and 
increases in skin conductance was found only for subjects 
required to suppress thoughts of sex. No relationship 
between skin conductance and the number of topic mentions 
was found for the weather suppression condition or either 
expression condition. These results were interpreted to 
mean that the act of suppressing an emotional topic results
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in heightened autonomic activity when intrusions are 
experienced. In other words, avoidance through suppression 
sets the stage for heightened emotional reactions when the 
suppressed topic returns.
One problem with this conclusion, is that the data 
cannot establish a temporal relation between changes in 
skin conductance and mentions of the suppressed topic. 
Therefore, whether intrusions during suppression lead to 
increased skin conductance levels or whether heightened 
autonomic activity leads to thought intrusions is unclear.
Merckelbach, Muris, van den Hout, and de Jong (1991) 
directly addressed this problem by investigating 
electrodermal responses immediately after a report of an 
intrusion. Specifically, these researchers required half 
the subjects to suppress thoughts of a white bear for a 
period of five minutes, followed by a period in which the 
subjects were instructed to think of anything at all. For 
the other half of the subjects the order was reversed. In 
addition to standard measures of skin conductance, subjects 
were equipped with a hand held event marker that marked the 
polygraph chart when pressed. Subjects were told to 
activate the event counter when they thought of a white 
bear. Skin conductance changes were judged to be related 
to white bear thoughts when the electrodermal change 
occurred 5 seconds before an event mark, and was not due to 
respiratory irregularities. Measures of autonomic activity
27
during baseline did not differ between groups. However, 
for those subjects who initially suppressed thoughts of a 
white bear, spontaneous fluctuations of electrodermal 
activity preceded a significantly greater percentage of 
white bear thoughts. This relationship between skin 
conductance changes and thoughts of a white bear was found 
during suppression and expression conditions. Thus, 
thoughts of a suppressed topic result in immediate 
fluctuations in autonomic activity when subjects are 
initially required to engage in suppression.
One possible explanation for these results argues that 
the electrodermal fluctuations result from heightened 
emotionality of the topic. In other words, the act of 
suppression increases the emotionality of the suppressed 
topic, even if this topic was originally of neutral 
valence. However, the question remains of how suppression 
could increase the emotionality of the topic. When 
considering exciting thoughts, one potential explanation is 
that cognitive avoidance through suppression results in a 
failure for the subject to emotionally habituate to 
thoughts of that topic (Wegner, et al., 1990). Therefore, 
if one attempts not to think about sex, intrusions will 
continue to be as emotionally laden as the initial thought 
of sex. The individual then will continue to experience 
the full intensity of the emotion associated with the 
thought.
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This explanation could not explain how a inherently 
neutral topic becomes more emotional. Therefore, an 
alternative hypothesis is that suppression results in 
increased emotionality because of the individual's failure 
to successfully suppress. This negative emotion then is 
paired with the unsuccessfully suppressed topic. In other 
words, because intrusions are by definition failures to 
suppress, the intrusive thought is marked by negative 
emotion. Although there is no direct empirical support for 
this hypothesis, the current data from Merckelbach et al. 
(1991) may support this explanation. Since the suppressed 
topic in this experiment was neutral and not inherently 
emotional, initial intrusions should not have produced an 
autonomic response. Thus, finding electrodermal 
fluctuations immediately after thoughts of a neutral, but 
forbidden topic suggests that the autonomic response is a 
function suppression failure rather than the inherent 
emotional characteristics of the thought.
In a separate group of studies Wenzlaff and colleagues 
investigated thought suppression in the context of a 
negative emotional state (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Klein, 1991; 
Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). In a study of 
individuals experiencing a depressed mood, Wenzlaff et al. 
(1988) found that depressed subjects exhibited greater 
difficulty in suppressing thoughts associated with a sad 
story than did subjects who were not experiencing a sad
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mood. The authors hypothesized that depressed subjects 
were more likely than non-depressed subjects to use other 
negative thoughts to distract themselves from the forbidden 
topic because of increased accessibility to the negative 
thoughts. Furthermore, the authors predicted that negative 
thoughts should prove less effective than positive thoughts 
in distracting the individual from the suppressed topic. 
This effect would be realized presumably because negative 
distracting thoughts are more closely associated to the 
forbidden topic than positive thoughts. A stream of 
consciousness analyses suggests that this hypothesis may be 
correct. Specifically, it was found that following 
thoughts of the forbidden topic, depressed subjects 
reported thinking other negative thoughts while non­
depressed subjects thought about positive topics.
Based on the results of this study, the authors 
concluded that attempts to suppress negative thoughts will 
more likely meet with failure if the individual is 
depressed. The proposed explanation for this effect is 
that depressed individuals are more likely to use negative 
distractors because negative thoughts are more accessible. 
Since the distractor and forbidden topic are emotionally 
related, the depressed individual will more likely 
experience an intrusion. Further investigations on the 
relation between mood and thought focused on the
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possibility that mood state itself could cue thoughts of a 
forbidden topic.
This issue of mood as a context that can inhibit 
successful suppression was investigated by Wenzlaff,
Wegner, and Klein (1991). In the first of two studies, the 
investigators experimentally manipulated subjects’ mood 
into either a positive or negative mood state using musical 
recordings. The subjects then either suppressed or 
expressed thoughts of a white bear. After a 15 minute 
manipulation check and distraction task, subjects were 
again exposed to either uplifting or depressing music. 
However, during this period all subjects were instructed to 
express thoughts of a white bear. Subjects who were 
instructed to initially suppress and were also in the same 
mood condition during both suppression and expression 
reported significantly more thoughts of a white bear during 
the second expression condition than did subjects who 
initially suppressed but were in different mood conditions 
during suppression and expression. For subjects who were 
initially instructed to express thoughts of a white bear, 
no differences in reported mentions occurred between the 
two mood conditions during the second expression period.
In a second study presented in the same article, 
subjects again were instructed to either suppress or 
express thoughts of a white bear during a musical mood 
manipulation. After a brief period, all subjects were told
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to express thoughts of a white bear. Immediately following 
this expression period, subjects' mood state was assessed 
using an adjective checklist. When mood state was used as 
the dependent variable, a significant interaction was found 
between initial suppression/expression condition and mood 
induction condition. Specifically, after the second 
expression period, subjects who initially suppressed white 
bear thoughts and who were in the negative mood condition 
rated their current mood state as significantly more 
negative than subjects in the positive mood condition. No 
differences in mood state were found for subjects who 
initially expressed thoughts of a white bear.
The findings of these two studies were taken as 
evidence that mood state forms a unique bond with 
suppressed thought. In the first study, greater numbers of 
previously suppressed thoughts occurred when the subject 
was in the same mood state during both expression and 
suppression periods. The second study concluded that 
expression of a previously suppressed thought affected the 
subjects' mood state such that current mood was similar to 
the affective state present when the topic was being 
suppressed.
One implication of these results is that avoiding an 
aversive thought through suppression can result in a 
vicious cycle of thought suppression followed by 
intrusions. For example, consider an emotionally
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distressed individual who attempts to suppress disturbing 
thoughts because she finds these thoughts too upsetting. 
Firstly, this current body of research suggests that a 
distressed individual will have greater difficulty 
suppressing an upsetting topic. If, however, the topic is 
initially suppressed, future intrusions will result in the 
individual experiencing a return to the previously 
distressed emotional state. The mood state may then act as 
a cue, thereby increasing the number of disturbing 
intrusions. The individual, distressed by these 
intrusions, then may make further attempts to suppress.
Attention and thought suppression. As alluded to 
previously, a potential effect of thought suppression could 
be a paradoxical increase in attentional resources 
allocated to identifying the suppressed stimuli. While the 
literature on thought suppression does not directly address 
the effect of suppression on attention, results from these 
studies suggest an explanation of how suppression can 
result in increased attention.
In the previous discussion of attention, the 
suggestion was made that attentional bias most likely 
occurs on a fairly automatic level and results from 
negative affect associated with a particular area of 
concern (Mathews, 1993). Although the influence of 
avoidant strategies on attentional processes is currently 
unknown, results of previous studies could be used to
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support the hypothesis that avoidant strategies may 
increase attention directed toward suppressed information.
Increased attentional allocation to the suppressed 
topic could occur if suppression increased the negative 
emotionality of suppressed information and/or led to 
increased negative affect experienced by the individual. 
Results of the thought suppression literature suggest that 
both increased emotionality of suppressed information and 
increased negative affect levels are likely to occur. 
Experiments using measures of autonomic activity found that 
expression of a previously suppressed thought results in 
electrodermal fluctuations (Merckelbach et al., 1991).
Also suggested was that the act of suppression itself 
increases the emotionality of the forbidden topic. In 
addition, certain emotional topics may produce even greater 
autonomic reactions because emotional properties associated 
with the information are never processed fully (Wegner, et 
al. 1990).
Another line of research suggests that if an 
individual attempts to suppress information while in a 
negative mood state, future intrusions of the suppressed 
information will be linked with negative mood (Wenzlaff, et 
al., 1991). It is likely that an individual's desire to 
suppress information is due to the effect the information 
has on the individual's emotional state. Therefore,
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subsequent intrusions may increase the negative affect 
experienced by the individual.
Lavy and van den Hout (in press) conducted a study 
directly attempting to determine how suppression 
subsequently impacts attention. In this investigation, 
subjects were randomly divided into either control or 
thought suppression groups. The subjects in the thought 
suppression condition were instructed not to think about 
"numbers" while those in the control condition could think 
of anything. Subsequent to this manipulation, all subjects 
participated in a color naming task with two types of 
stimulus words: number words and substance words (control). 
The results of this study showed only limited support for 
the hypothesis that suppression leads to slower responses 
for the relevant words. Specifically, the research found 
only during the first fifteen trials did thought 
suppression subjects show higher levels of interference for 
words relevant to suppression (number words).
A number of factors may account for the marginal 
finding in this study. Firstly, the unemotional nature of 
the suppressed topic is one reason the effect may have been 
so transient. Although suppression itself may increase the 
emotionality of neutral information (Merckelbach, et al., 
1991 ), it is likely that greater effects would be found for 
inherently emotional topics (Wegner et al., 1990). A 
second possibility is that subjects would have been more
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motivated to suppress if the topic was both disturbing and 
personally relevant. Finally, failure to suppress 
information that is both disturbing and personally relevant 
likely would result in greater levels of emotional distress 
which in turn may result in increased attention directed 
toward the suppressed information.
In sum, suppression of thought seems to undermine 
emotional control by establishing conditions where the 
unwanted emotional thought is easily activated (Wegner, et 
al., 1990). One possible reason these unwanted thoughts 
intrude into awareness is that the act of avoidance 
paradoxically increases attention directed toward the 
unwanted topic (Lavy & van den Hout, in press; Mathews, 
1993). The aim of the second part of this project was to 
test the hypothesis that increased attentional resources 
would be allocated to previously suppressed information.
In this project the suppressed information was both 
distressing and personally relevant, thus exploring a 
previously untested variable.
Overview of Proposed Study
The general aim of this study was to investigate the 
effect of a major stressor, a heart attack, on an 
individual's cognitive processes. Individuals who have had 
a heart attack provide an interesting population for 
studying the cop.ing responses to a major stressor. A heart 
attack is a real, objectively defined, and distinct
stressor. As previously discussed, MI patients report 
emotional changes after an attack, and develop rather 
specific worries about the future. In the first part the 
study, I intended to investigate potential attentional 
biases that may have resulted as a function of the 
patient's emotional and cognitive state. It was predicted 
that MI patients would show longer response latencies for 
cardiac related stimuli when compared with control 
subject's responses. Specificity in the attention 
capturing features of the distractors was also hypothesized 
such that the response time latencies to socially- 
threatening distractors for MI subjects would not differ 
from response time latencies for neutral distractors.
It has been suggested that certain avoidant cognitive 
strategies, such as suppression, lead to increased 
attention toward suppressed information (Lavy & van den 
Hout, in press; Mathews, 1993; Suls & Fletcher, 1 985;
Wegner & Erber, 1992). If this suppressed information is 
particularly disturbing, then the paradoxical increase in 
attention can potentially lead to further emotional 
distress for the individual. For example, consider an 
individual who attempts to suppress thoughts of a heart 
attack because of the negative emotional characteristics 
associated with MI thoughts. If suppression leads to 
increased attentional capture for cardiac stimuli, the
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increased identification of threatening stimuli may result 
in higher levels of arousal and negative affect.
In the second part of this study, avoidant coping 
styles were artificially manipulated by requesting that 
half of the subjects avoid thoughts associated with cardiac 
functioning. The other half of the subjects thought about 
anything at all. It was predicted that suppression of 
heart-related thoughts would result in longer response 
latencies for cardiac distractors. However, it was 
suspected that suppression of cardiac thoughts would be 
particularly difficult for subjects who experienced an MI, 
as cardiac-related thoughts are frequent, emotional, and 
personally relevant (Wiklund, et al., 1986). Therefore, it 
also was predicted that the increase in attentional bias 
would be evident particularly for MI patients.
To test these hypotheses, MI patients and age-matched 
controls participated in a attentional bias task. The 
subjects were presented with an attentional search task 
requiring them to locate and respond to a particular 
stimuli when distractors are present. It was predicted 
that performance of MI patients, but not control subjects, 
would slow when cardiac-related distractors were present. 
Following this task, half of the subjects were instructed 
not to think about heart attacks or anything related to 
cardiac functioning for five minutes. The other half of 
the subjects thought of anything at all for five minutes.
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Upon completion of this manipulation, subjects again 
completed the attentional search task in order to assess 
how suppression affects allocation of attentional 
resources. Finally, all subjects were instructed to think 
about anything for a period of five minutes and to record 
number of heart related thoughts. It was predicted that 
subjects who were previously instructed to suppress would 
experience more heart-related thoughts in this second 
period of thought monitoring.
As previously discussed, how predisposing 
characterological features effect attentional biases and 
the ability to successfully suppress information is 
unclear. The results of one study (MacLeod & Mathews,
1988) suggest that individuals who are trait anxious may be 
predisposed toward developing attentional biases to 
stressful stimuli. Therefore, trait anxiety as measured by 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, et 
al., 1970) was administered to all subjects in order to 
determine if differences in report of trait anxiety effect 
attentional processes. Measures of state anxiety and 
depression also were measured to assess the influence of 
current mood state on response time latencies to threat 
cues.
Other research by Miller (1980; Miller & Birnbaum,
1988) suggests certain individuals may be more successful 
at avoiding stressful stimuli, while others tend to seek
out stress-relevant information. This individual 
difference variable may influence both attentional 
processes and the ability to suppress. An individual's 
coping style could influence measures of attentional bias 
if the strategic processes of coping are directly related 
to attention. Also, if coping style influences the ability 
of an individual to successfully suppress information, 
certain individuals may experience less intrusive thoughts 
after a period of suppression. To assess the possible 
influence of an individual's coping style on attention, the 
Miller Behavioral Style Scale was administered to all 
subjects.
Finally, other individual difference factors such as 
cardiac concern level may contribute to the degree of 
attentional bias. Cardiac concern level was measured 
using a 14-item scale requiring subjects to rate the degree 
they think or worry about cardiac functioning.
It was predicted that measures of emotional distress 
(trait anxiety, state anxiety, and depression) and concern 
regarding the MI would have a positive relationship with 
response time latencies for MI subjects when threat-related 
words were present. Although it is possible that coping 
style would be associated with measures of attentional 
bias, a significant relationship was not predicted. The 
prediction of the null hypothesis for coping style is based
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on the assumption that attentional biases are more 
automatic while measures of coping reflect only a preferred 
behavioral style (Mathews, 1993).
METHODS
Subjects
Two groups of subjects participated in this study: MI 
patients (n=34) and control subjects with no history of 
heart disease (n=3l). Qualified MI patients were sent a 
letter requesting participation in a study investigating 
psychological sequelae of a heart attack. Two private 
cardiology clinics provided names and addresses of 
prospective subjects. A staff cardiologist had diagnosed 
all subjects in this group with myocardial infarction based 
on clinical, electrocardiographic, and laboratory data. 
Response rate to this call for volunteers was approximately 
1 in 10. No information was collected on individuals 
unwilling to participate. Three respondents who were 
currently using anxiolytic medication or who had a 
significant psychiatric history were excluded from 
participation.
Individuals age- and sex-matched to MI patients were 
recruited to serve as control subjects. Exclusion criteria 
for this group included known history of coronary artery 
disease and previous psychiatric contact. All subjects had 
at least a high school education and were able to read 
information presented on the computer screen. One control 
subject was excluded after reporting difficulty reading 
instructions on computer screen and being able to identify 
target words on practice trials. Finally, subjects were
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informed of their rights as subjects and were required to 
sign an informed consent (see Appendix B).
Measures
Demographic information. All subjects received a 
demographic information form. Information on age, gender, 
sex, education level, marital status, possible psychiatric 
history, and current prescription medication was collected 
(see Appendix A). Additional information collected on MI 
subjects included length of time since MI, history of heart 
disease before MI, and history of previous myocardial 
infarcts.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). The STAI 
(Spielberger, et al., 1970) is an instrument designed to 
measure both state and trait levels of anxiety. State 
anxiety refers to feelings of tension, apprehension, worry, 
and nervousness reported by an individual. This emotional 
state is viewed as dynamic and changing. Trait anxiety, 
however, is conceptualized as more stable and enduring, and 
specifically refers to a predisposition to respond 
anxiously to stressful situations. In this questionnaire, 
each of these constructs is measured via a 20-item scale 
and thus produces two scores: a trait anxiety score and a 
state anxiety score (see Appendix C).
Extensive normative and psychometric data have been 
gathered on the STAI. In addition to normative data 
gathered on general population adults, norms for general
medical and surgical patients also are available. Test- 
retest reliabilities for trait anxiety averaged .76, and 
the average test-retest reliability coefficient for state 
anxiety was .33 (Spielberger, et al., 1970). The greater 
variability in state anxiety scores was expected because 
this construct is hypothesized to measure a transitory 
emotional state. Measures of internal consistency were 
greater than .90 for both measures of state and trait 
anxiety. In terms of concurrent validity, the STAI has a 
strong relationship with other measures of anxiety such as 
the IPAT Anxiety Scale (Cattell & Scheier, 1963) and the 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1953).
Miller Behavioral Style Scale (MBSS). The MBSS is a 
scale designed to identify individual differences in 
avoidant versus attentive coping strategies (Miller, 1980). 
The assumption underlying this scale is that certain 
individuals use avoidant strategies when coping with stress 
(blunters), and others attend to stressful information 
(monitors). In the MBSS, respondents are presented with 
four hypothetical situations followed by eight statements, 
half reflecting a monitoring strategy and half reflecting a 
blunting strategy. Subjects are instructed to place a mark 
next to each behavior they may have used in responding to 
the hypothetical situation (see Appendix D). Scores 
derived from this scale include a monitoring score and a
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blunting score. These two scores can be combined to form a 
composite score or can be used separately.
Normative data based on either the responses of 
college students or various medical populations are 
available. Internal consistency coefficients average .71. 
Test-retest reliabilities range from .68 to .79, with 
monitoring scores showing slightly more stability than 
blunting scores (Miller, 1980; 1987; Miller & Managan, 
1983). In addition, Miller and colleagues (Miller, 1987; 
Miller & Managan, 1983) have shown the MBSS successfully 
discriminates between coping style and measures of trait 
anxiety, depression, and Type A behavior. Additionally, 
the constructs of monitoring and blunting were shown to be 
independent of social desirability (Fuller & Conner, 1990). 
In terms of predictive validity, the MBSS has been shown to 
predict behavior in an experimental task when subjects were 
threatened with electric shock (Miller, 1987).
Cardiac Concern Questionnaire (CCQ ). The CCQ was 
specifically created for the current project and was 
designed to measure level of worry regarding cardiac 
functioning. Modeled after other self-rating scales of 
cardiac concern (Thompson, et al., 1987), the CCQ is 
comprised of 14 questions designed to cover the following 
domains: worry regarding the MI, concern about future 
cardiac problems, concern regarding cardiac state affecting 
social/occupational functioning, and hypersensitivity to
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aberrant cardiac sensations. Responses to items range from 
zero to eight. One total score of general cardiac concern 
is derived from this questionnaire, with larger scores 
reflecting greater cardiac concern (See Appendix F).
Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression Scale 
(CES-D). To assess for level of depressive symptomology 
all subjects completed the CES-D (Radloff, 1977). This 
instrument is a 20-item, self-report measure requiring 
respondents to rate the frequency of depressive symptoms in 
the past week (see Appendix G). The CES-D was developed 
for research in non-psychiatric populations and is 
appropriate for use in medically-ill and healthy samples 
(Devins, Orme, Costello, Binik, Frizzell, Stam, & Pullin, 
1988). Although items contained on the scale were designed 
to measure the affective component of depressed mood, other 
researchers have suggested that the CES-D can be used as a 
general measure of psychological distress because some 
items measure anxiety and self-esteem (Orme, Reis, & Herz, 
1986). The scale has good internal consistency (.85 to 
.90), and a large body of normative data has been gathered 
on the scale (Lewinson & Lee, 1981; Rehm, 1988).
Rating of MI severity. The proposal for this project 
included MI severity ratings to be completed by the 
patient's cardiologist. Unfortunately, staff physicians 
were unwilling to complete the rating form, and therefore, 
data on this variable was not obtained.
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Attentional Search Task
The following task was derived from the procedures 
used in Mathews et al. (1990). During this procedure, 
subjects were presented with a group of three words on a 
computer monitor. One of three words was a target word, 
while the other two words present in this group were 
distractors. Subjects were informed that the goal of this 
task was to locate the target word and respond by pressing 
the appropriate key on the keyboard. Subjects completed a 
total of 258 trials.
Procedure. The specific steps for each trial were as 
follows. Three plus signs (+) appeared vertically on the 
monitor and were spaced one inch apart. These plus signs 
served only to initially orient the subject's vision and 
were presented only for 500 milliseconds (ms) before being 
immediately replaced by three- word groups that included 
one target word and two distractors. Two target words were 
used, namely "right" and "left". Only one target word 
appeared on screen in each three-word group. If the word 
"right" appeared, the subject should have responded by 
pressing a key marked "RIGHT". (The "/" key was covered 
with a label with "RIGHT" printed on it). If the word 
"left" appeared, the subject should have responded by 
pressing a key marked "LEFT". (The "z" key was covered 
with a label with "LEFT" printed on it). The target word 
was randomly placed at one of the three possible vertical
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locations. After the subject responded with a key press, 
the screen appeared blank for 500 ms. The phrase "Get 
Ready" appeared for 500 ms and was followed by a new trial.
Distractors. The other two words presented with the 
target word are known as distractors. The three different 
types of distractors presented with the target word 
included 21 cardiac-related words, 21 socially threatening 
words, and 21 categorized neutral words (See Appendix G). 
Words within the distractor groups were matched for length 
and frequency based on the standards provided by Francis 
and Kucera (1982). Both distractors were drawn from the 
same category for all trials. For example, the target word 
"right" may have been presented with the words "heart" and 
"blood", both cardiac distractors.
Materials. Stimuli were presented on the monitor of a 
Zenith Supersport 286 portable computer and controlled 
through the use of Micro Experimental Lab (MEL) software 
(Schneider, 1988).
Thought Suppression Manipulation
Following the attentional search task, subjects were 
randomly assigned into one of two experimental conditions: 
a suppress-thought condition and a free-thought condition. 
Instructions for both conditions appeared on computer 
screen. Subjects in the suppress-thought condition were 
instructed not to think about their heart functioning or 
any cardiac-related stimuli for five minutes. In other
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words, these subjects were instructed to actively avoid 
thinking about any topic related to cardiac functioning. 
Subjects in the free-thought condition were instructed to 
think of anything they desired to think about. References 
to cardiac-related thoughts were equal in number for each 
instructional set. An equal number of references to 
"heart" were made to ensure that any putative effects 
occurring after the suppress-thought manipulation would not 
be due to merely mentioning the topic.
In both conditions, subjects were instructed to ring a 
desk bell if they experienced any cardiac-related thoughts 
during the five-minute period. The experimenter left the 
room during the thought monitoring period, and bell rings 
were recorded on a tape recorder. After the experimental 
session, the tape was played back and the number of bell 
rings coded.
Upon completion of the suppression/free thought phase, 
subjects were informed to cease monitoring their thoughts 
and to think about anything they desired. Subjects then 
were asked to again participate in the attentional search 
task. The procedures involved in the second attentional 
search task were identical to those previously described 
(selecting target word "left" or "right" from a three-word 
group). Upon completion of the second attentional search 
task, all subjects participated in a five-minute period of 
free thought. Instructions for this condition were
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identical to those given in the free-thought condition 
previously described, and tape recorded bell rings were 
again used to measure cardiac thought frequency.
To review, subject participation in this study 
occurred in five distinct phases: (1) participation in 
attentional search task, (2) participation in either free- 
thought or suppress-thought condition [Period 1] (3 )
participation in attentional search task (4) participation 
in a period of free-thought [Period 2] and (5) completion 
of self-report questionnaires.
Procedure
MI subjects who responded who participated were tested 
in meeting rooms located in the cardiology clinic. Control 
subjects completed the experimental procedures either in a 
student office located in the Psychology Department at 
Louisiana State University or in their home. After signing 
the informed consent, all subjects began the experiment by 
participating in the attentional search task. Subjects 
then were assigned alternately to either the suppress 
thought or free thought condition. Following the five 
minute period of cardiac thought monitoring required in 
each condition, all subjects again participated in an 
attentional search task that was identical in both 
procedure and content to the initial search task. After 
the second attentional search task, all subjects 
participated in a five minute period of thought monitoring.
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The instructions used in this final period of thought 
monitoring were identical to the instructions previously 
administered in the free thought condition. Subjects 
completed the experiment by responding to the 
questionnaires presented in the following order: State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory, the Cardiac Concern Questionnaire, 
the Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression Scale, 
and the Miller Behavioral Style Scale.
RESULTS
Proposed Analyses
Descriptive information. Demographic information 
(Appendix A) for MI and control subjects are presented in 
Table 1. The two groups were equivalent in terms of age, 
education level, race, and sex. Presented in Table 2 are 
group means for all self-report measures (STAI-T, STAI-S, 
CCQ, CES-D, and MBSS). A between-subject group t-test was 
performed for each measure to assess for differences on 
these measures. This series of analyses indicate the 
groups differed on the Cardiac Concern Questionnaire, 
t ( 1, 63 ) = 29.82, £ < .001, and the CES-D, t(1,63) = 4.96, p
<.05, with MI subjects exhibiting heightened levels of both 
cardiac concern and depressive symptoms (See Table 2). No 
group differences or trends emerged for measures of trait 
anxiety (STAI-T), state anxiety (STAI-S), desire to seek 
information (MBSS-Monitor), or desire to avoid information 
(MBSS-Blunt) . When compared with standardization samples, 
the CES-D, STAI-S, and STAI-T means are within normal 
limits for both MI and control samples (Devins, et al.,
1988; Spielberger, et al., 1970).
Medication usage was recorded for all MI subjects.
The most common pharmacological agents taken by the 
subjects in this sample included vasodilators, calcium 
channel blocking agents, antihypertensives, beta blocking 





MI Subjects Control Subjects
Mean Age 60.94(11.84) 59.37(10.90)
Level of Education:
High School 12% 21%
Technical College 15% 12%
Some College 12% 19%
College Graduate 40% 39%







Mean Days Since MI 95.27(56.43) NA






CAD - Coronary artery disease
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Table 2
Group Means for Self-report Measures and Demographic 
Frequencies
Self-report Measures












4 .41 (1 .82 )
12.60(10.40)** 













significant at the .05 level 
significant at the .001 level 
standard deviation 
Cardiac Concern Questionnaire 
state anxiety 
trait anxiety
desire to seek information 
desire to avoid information
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were subjects taking beta blockers (n=9) because of 
potential influences reaction time. Although beta blocking 
agents may have influenced subjects response time, it is 
unlikely that its effect would differentially impact 
reaction time to threat and neutral distractors.
Correlations. Two separate interference indices were 
computed by subtracting the reaction time (RT) to socially- 
threatening distractors and the RT to cardiac distractors 
from RT for neutral distractors (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; 
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). This computation was 
performed only on trials occurring before the suppression 
manipulation and yielded two indices of attentional bias: 
Socially-Threatening Interference Index (Social Threat) and 
Cardiac Threat Interference Index (Cardiac Threat). 
Correlation matrices then were computed for Social Threat, 
Cardiac Threat, CES-D, STAI-T, STAI-S, Cardiac Concern 
Questionnaire (CCQ), MBSS-Monitor, MBSS-Blunt, cardiac 
thought frequency during the first thought monitoring 
period (Period 1), and cardiac thought frequency during the 
second thought monitoring period (Period 2). Separate 
matrices were created for all subjects combined, MI 
subjects only, and control subjects only (Tables 3, 4, and 
5 respectively). To control for Type 1 error, only 




Correlation Matrix: Data for All Subjects
CTII STI I BELLI BELL2 CES-D
CTII 1 .00 .44** . 1 1 . 09 . 1 6
STII .44** 1 . 00 -.09 . 03 . 42**
BELLI . 1 1 -.09 1 .00 .73** . 1 3
BELL2 .09 . 03 .73** 1 . 00 .37*
CES-D . 1 6 .42** . 1 3 .37* 1 . 00
STAI-S .09 . 32* . 1 2 .32* . 62**
STAI-T .20 . 38** .23 .21 . 62**
MONITOR . 1 1 -.01 . 1 1 .00 . 04
BLUNT -.07 -.14 .05 -.04 -.12
CCQ -.13 . 1 2 . 1 0 .32* .45**
STAI-S STAI-T MONITOR BLUNT CCQ
CTI I . 09 .20 . 1 1 -.07 -.13
STI I . 32* .38** -.01 -.14 . 1 2
BELLI . 1 2 .23 . 1 1 . 05 . 1 0
BELL2 .32* .21 . 00 -.04 . 32*
CES-D . 62** .62** . 04 -.12 .45**
STAI-S 1 . 00 . 68** . 1 0 . 0 1 . 36*
STAI-T .68** 1 . 00 . 07 . 00 .23
MONITOR . 1 0 . 07 1 . 00 -.04 -.07
BLUNT .01 . 00 -.04 1 . 00 -.05
CCQ . 36* .23 -.07 -.05 1 . 00
* - significance level p < .01
** - significance level p < .001
CTII - Cardiac Threat Interference Index
STII - Social Threat Interference Index
BELLI - # of heart-related thoughts during 
monitoring period
1 st
BELL2 - # of heart-related thoughts during 
monitoring period
2nd
STAI-S - state anxiety
STAI-T - trait anxiety
MONITOR - desire to seek threatening information
(MBSS-Monitor )
BLUNT - desire to avoid threatening information
(MBSS-Blunt)
CCQ - Cardiac Concern Questionnaire
Table 4
Correlation Matrix: Data for MI Subjects Only
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CTII STII BELLI BELL2 CES-D
CTII 1 . 00 . 47* . 1 0 -.06 .30
STII .47* 1 . 00 -.06 . 1 7 . 51 *
BELLI . 1 0 -.06 1 . 00 . 69** .23
BELL2 -.06 . 1 7 . 69** 1 .00 . 48*
CES-D .30 . 51 * .23 .48* 1 . 00
STAI-S . 08 . 36 .29 .44* .77**
STAI-T .29 .50* . 18 .24 . 72**
MONITOR . 30 .23 -.28 -.23 . 07
BLUNT -.22 -.04 -.04 -.02 .07
CCQ -.02 . 23 .29 . 37 . 38
STAI-S STAI-T MONITOR BLUNT CCQ
CTII . 08 .29 .30 -.22 -.02
STII . 36 .50* .23 -.04 .23
BELLI .29 . 1 8 -.28 -.04 .29
BELL2 . 44* .24 -.23 -.02 . 37
CES-D . 77** . 72** .07 .07 . 38
STAI-S 1 . 00 . 78** . 1 1 . 1 7 . 42*
STAI-T . 78** 1 . 00 . 02 . 1 2 .41
MONITOR . 1 1 . 02 1 . 00 -.19 . 03
BLUNT . 1 7 . 1 2 -.19 1 .00 . 1 1
CCQ . 42* .41 . 03 . 1 1 1 .00
* - significance level p < .01 
** - significance level p < .001
CTII - Cardiac Threat Interference Index
STII - Social Threat Interference Index
BELLI - # of heart-related thoughts 
monitoring period
during 1 st
BELL2 - # of heart-related thoughts 
monitoring period
during 2nd
STAI-S - state anxiety
STAI-T - trait anxiety
MONITOR - desire to seek threatening information
(MBSS-Monitor )
BLUNT - desire to avoid threatening information
(MBSS-Blunt )
CCQ - Cardiac Concern Questionnaire
Table 5
Correlation Matrix: Data for Control Subjects Only
CTII STII BELLI BELL2 CES-D
CTII 1 . 00 . 42* . 1 3 .20 -.02
STII . 42* 1 . 00 -.08 -.10 .42*
BELLI . 1 3 -.08 1 .00 . 90** . 1 1
BELL2 .20 -.10 . 90** 1 .00 .20
CES-D -.02 . 42* . 1 1 .20 1 . 00
STAI-S . 1 5 .46* . 1 1 . 03 .32
STAI-T .25 . 39 .29 .24 .55**
MONITOR -.01 -.08 .39 . 39 .22
BLUNT . 05 -.22 . 1 1 .00 -.44*
CCQ -. 51 * . 1 5 .00 . 06 . 34
STAI-S STAI-T MONITOR BLUNT CCQ
CTII . 1 5 .25 -.01 .05 -.51*
STII .46* . 39 -.08 -.22 . 1 5
BELLI . 1 1 . 29 . 39 . 1 1 . 00
BELL2 .03 .24 .39 .00 . 06
CES-D . 32 .55** .22 -.44* . 34
STAI-S 1 .00 . 59** . 07 -.17 .07
STAI-T . 59** 1 .00 . 1 3 -.11 -.02
MONITOR .07 . 1 3 1 . 00 . 1 1 -.08
BLUNT -.17 -.11 . 1 1 1 .00 -.32
CCQ . 07 -.02 -.08 -.32 1 . 00
* - significance level p < .01
** - significance level p < .001
CTII - Cardiac Threat Interference Index
STII - Social Threat Interference Index
BELLI - # of heart -related thoughts during 1st
monitoring period
BELL2 - # of heart -related thoughts during 2nd
monitoring period
STAI-S - state anxiety
STAI-T - trait anxiety
MONITOR - desire to seek threatening information
(MBSS-Monitor )
BLUNT - desire to avoid threatening information
(MBSS-Blunt )
CCQ - Cardiac Concern Questionnai re
58
When the data for all subjects were included, a 
strong positive relationship was found among all measures 
of emotional distress (CES-D, STAI-T, and STAI-S), and 
between measures of current emotional distress (CES-D and 
STAI-S) and the CCQ. Additionally, the CES-D (r = .42 , £
< .001), the STAI-S (r = .33, £ < .01), and STAI-T (r =
.38, £ < .001) showed a positive relationship with Social 
Threat. The only other significant correlation to emerge 
was between bell rings in the second thought monitoring 
period and the CES-D (r = .37, £ < .01), the STAI-S (r =
.32, £ < .01), and the CCQ (r = .32, £ < .01).
Inspection of the separate correlation matrices for MI 
subjects and control subjects suggests some variables have 
differing interrelationships for the two groups. Table 4 
indicates when the data from MI subjects alone were
analyzed, measures of emotional distress (CES-D, STAI-S,
STAI-T) were again highly correlated with each other.
While only the STAI-S was significantly correlated with the 
Cardiac Concern Questionnaire (r = .42, £ < .01), the 
relationship between both the CES-D and the CCQ (r = .38, £ 
> .01) and the STAI-T and the CCQ (r = .41, £ > .01) 
approached significance. Additionally, a significant 
positive relationship was found between Social Threat and 
the CES-D (r = .51, £ < .01) and Social Threat and the
STAI-T (r = .50, £ < .01). The relationship between state 
anxiety (STAI-S) and Social Threat approached significance
59
(r = .36, £ > .01). Finally, both measures of current 
emotional distress (CES-D and STAI-S) were positively 
correlated with bell rings during the second period of 
thought monitoring.
The matrix derived from control subjects' data shows 
cardiac concern and measures of emotional distress were 
uncorrelated (see Table 5). However, a strong positive 
correlation was found again among CES-D, STAI-S, and STAI- 
T. Control subjects, like MI subjects, showed a strong 
positive correlation between Social Threat and measures of 
emotional distress (CES-D - r = .42, £ < .01; STAI-S - r =
.46, £ < .01; and STAI-T - r = .39, £ > . 0 1 ) .  An 
interesting relationship present only in control subject 
data emerged between the Cardiac Concern Questionnaire and 
Cardiac Threat (r = .-51, £ < .01). This finding indicates
that RT speeding occurred for control subjects who 
acknowledged greater concern regarding their cardiac 
functioning. Finally, the blunting scale of the MBSS was 
negatively correlated with the CES-D (r = -.44, £ < .01).
Analysis of variance. Reaction time outliers were 
removed by selecting only responses within 100 ms and three 
standard deviations of each subject's mean (Mathews, et 
al., 1990). A repeated measures analysis of variance was 
conducted with two within-subject factors (Word type and 
Time) and two between-subject variables (MI group and 
Suppression group). Word type has three levels (cardiac-
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related, socially-threatening, and neutral distractors) and 
Time has two levels (the attentional search task conducted 
before and after the Thought Suppression Manipulation).
The response time means for all cells are presented in 
Table 6.
Of particular interest in this study were potential 
interactions involving Word type. Although a main effect 
for Word type approached significance F(2,124) = 2.84, £ < 
.07, no significant interactions with Word type were 
present. A main effect emerged for Time F(1,62) = 4.86, £>
< .05, indicating that RTs quickened after the suppression
manipulation. This effect was moderated by a Suppression 
Group x Time interaction F(1,62) = 4.07, jp < .05. A review
of Table 7 shows that the degree of change in RT depended 
upon whether subjects were instructed to suppress thoughts 
about their heart functioning or to think about anything. 
Contrary to prediction, RTs for the suppress-thought 
condition showed some evidence of speeding when compared to 
RTs for the free-thought condition. However, no 
significant interactions included the factor Word type, and 
therefore, this finding did not address the hypothesis that 
suppressing cardiac thoughts later increases attention 
directed to heart-related words. A follow-up analysis was 
conducted using only heart-related and socially threatening 
distractor RTs as the dependent variables and using RT to 
neutral words as a covariate. In this analysis of
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Table 7
RT Means (In Milliseconds) for Time x Suppression Group 
Interaction
Suppression Group 
Suppress Thought Free Thought
Time 1 913 935
Time 2 865 933
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covariance, there were no significant main effects or 
interactions. The failure to find any significant 
differences indicates that the main variables of interest, 
RT to cardiac and socially threatening distractors, neither 
changed after the suppression manipulation nor were 
affected by MI group membership.
Regression. To assess the influence of state anxiety, 
trait anxiety, depression level, cardiac concern, coping 
style, and MI group on interference from socially 
threatening and cardiac distractors, two regression 
equations were computed. In the first equation, RT when 
cardiac distractors were present served as the dependent 
variable. RT when neutral distractors were present was 
entered initially into the equation, and the resulting 
residual was used as a measure of interference from cardiac 
distractors. RT when neutral distractors were present 
proved to have a strong relationship with RT when cardiac 
distractors were present (R square = .94). All other 
variables (CES-D, STAI-S, STAI-T, MBSS-Monitor, CCQ, and MI 
group) then were entered into the equation. Those that did 
not contribute to prediction of the residual were removed 
in a stepwise fashion.
As shown in Table 8, a combination of CCQ, STAI-T, and 
MI group was the best predictor of interference from 
cardiac distractors F(3,60) = 3.78, p < .05 (R square
change = .001). In addition to the proposed dependent
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Table 8
Regression Equation Predicting RT When Cardiac Distractors 
Were Present After First Accounting for Variance Shared 
with RT When Neutral Distractors Were Present
---------------- Variables in the Equation -----
Variable Partial Corr T Sig. of T
CCQ -.08 -2.66 .01
STAI-T .08 2.62 .01
MI .06 2.12 .04
Significance of R square change: 
F(3,60 ) = 3.78, £ < .02
 Introduction of Interaction between CCQ and MI group--
Variable Partial Corr T Sig. of T
Interact .06 2.01 .05
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Table 9
Regression Equation Predicting RT When Socially Threatening 
Distractors Were Present After First Accounting for 
Variance Shared with RT When Neutral Distractors Were 
Present
  Variables in the Equation -----
Variable Partial Corr T Sig. of T
CES-D 3 . 64 .0006
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variables, an additional variable was created to represent 
the interaction between MI group and the CCQ (Interact). 
This interaction term was included because an inspection of 
the correlation matrices for MI and control subjects 
suggests that the relationship between CCQ and Cardiac 
Threat differs for the two subject groups. Inclusion of 
the Interact variable in the regression equation proved 
significant, F(1,59) = 4.05, £ < .05, and indicates that 
CCQ differentially predicted cardiac threat interference 
for MI and control subjects.
To predict interference from socially-threatening 
distractors, similar regression procedures were used. 
Response time latencies when socially-threatening 
distractors were present were used as the dependent 
variable. To control for individual differences in 
reaction time, response time latencies when neutral words 
were present were entered first into the equation and this 
variable again accounted for 94% of the variance. The 
remaining variables then were entered into the equation, 
and those that failed to predict the residual were removed 
in a stepwise fashion (See Table 9). In the resulting 
equation only CES-D remained, and this equation reached 
significance, F(1,62) = 13.24, p < .01 (R square change =
.01 ). As indicated in the correlation matrix for all 
subjects, other measures of emotional distress were also 
significantly correlated with Social Threat. However, due
Table 10
Frequency of Cardiac Thoughts
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Period 1 Period 2
Suppress Thought
Condition 1.91 2.97
(n = 33 )
Free Thought
Condition 3.29 2.77
(n = 3 1 )
Period 1 Period 2
MI
Subjects 2.44 3.67
(n = 34 )
Control
Subjects 2.73 2.03
(n = 3 1 )
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to the variance common to the three measures of emotional 
distress, only the scale with the greatest correlation 
coefficient was included in the regression equation.
Effect of suppression instructions on frequency of 
heart-related thoughts. Bell rings were used to measure 
frequency of heart related thoughts during Period 1 and 
Period 2. To assess for changes from the first thought 
monitoring period to the second, a mixed analysis of 
variance was conducted that included one within-subject 
factor, Session (first and second), and two between-subject 
variables, MI group and Suppression group. In this 
analysis two 2-way interactions emerged: Suppression group 
x Session F(1,61 ) = 5.92, p < .02, and MI group x Session 
F(1 ,61 ) = 7.25, p < .01. The means for both 2-way 
interactions are shown on Table 10.
Post-hoc contrasts then were performed to further 
explore each interaction. When using the means derived 
from the Suppression group x Session interaction, the only 
significant comparison to emerge was between the two 
suppression conditions during Period 1. This indicates 
that subjects in the suppress- thought condition reported 
fewer cardiac-related thoughts than subjects in the free- 
thought condition. Post-hoc comparisons of cell means from 
the MI group x Session interaction were performed using 
Tukey's test. The only significant comparison found was 
between MI and control subjects during Period 2. This
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finding suggests that during a period of free thought, MI 
subjects reported more heart-related thoughts than control 
subjects.
Exploratory Analyses
The findings from the proposed analysis of variance 
failed to support the main hypotheses of interest as no 
significant interactions with Word type emerged. However, 
results from correlation matrices and regression equations 
indicate other variables, specifically negative 
emotionality (CES-D, STAI-S, and STAI-T) and level of 
cardiac concern (CCQ) , moderate the subject's RT when 
socially threatening or heart-related words were present. 
The analyses performed in this section were designed to aid 
in the understanding of the moderating effects of negative 
emotionality and level of cardiac concern.
Effects of negative emotionality and cardiac concern 
on the attentional deployment task. In the following 
analysis, only RT measures obtained before the Thought 
Suppression manipulation were included. Excluding all RTs 
greater than 3 standard deviations of subjects mean or less 
than 100 ms again discarded aberrant responses. Conducting 
a median-split based on subject CCQ scores formed two 
cardiac concern groups (high and low). To produce 
equivalent cell sizes it was necessary to use different 
medians for MI and control subjects. A negative- 
emotionality factor was created based on median-splits
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using either CES-D scores (high and low depression), STAI-S 
scores (high and low state anxiety), and STAI-T scores 
(high and low trait anxiety). Again, different medians 
were used to avoid creation of unequal cells, but for these 
measures the absolute differences between the MI group 
median and control group median were small.
Separate analyses were conducted for MI and control 
subjects. The decision to analyze the two subject groups 
separately was based on the following criteria: (1)
presence of an interaction between MI group and the CCQ in
regression equations, and (2) use of disparate CCQ medians 
for MI and control subjects (MI subjects - median = 34;
control subjects - median = 12).
Three ANOVAs were conducted separately for MI and 
control subjects. Each of the three analyses included one 
within-subject factor, Word type, and two between-subject 
factors, Cardiac Concern group and Negative Emotionality 
group (using either CES-D, STAI-S, and STAI-T). In other 
words, three separate analyses were performed, and in each 
analysis only one of the three measures of distress was 
used to create the Negative Emotionality variable. The 
repetition of similar analyses was conducted because of the 
post-hoc nature of this investigation.
In the first analysis, the Negative Emotionality 
variable was formed through a median split of trait anxiety 
scores, thus forming high- and low-trait anxious groups.
As previously described, the analysis also included one 
other between-subject factor, Cardiac Concern group (high 
and low), and one within-subject factor, Word type. For MI 
subjects, only Word type effect emerged F(2,60) = 3.11, £ = 
.05. To further explore this main effect, Tukey1s test was 
used to compare the RT means for cardiac, socially- 
threatening, and neutral distractors. RT when socially- 
threatening distractors were present differed from RT when 
neutral were present, but the RT to socially-threatening 
distractors did not differ from RT to cardiac distractors. 
Although RT to cardiac distractors failed to differ from RT 
to neutral distractors, this contrast approached 
significance. An inspection of the means presented on 
Table 11 suggests that RTs to both cardiac and socially- 
threatening distractors were slower than RT to neutral 
distractors.
In the analysis involving control subjects, two 2~way 
interactions were present: Trait Anxiety group x Word type 
F(2,54) = 9.50, p < .001, and Cardiac Concern group x Word
type F(2,54) = 4.60, p < .02. The means for both
interactions are presented on Table 12. To further 
investigate this interaction, Tukey's test was used again. 
For the Trait Anxiety group x Word type interaction, RT to 
threat cues (cardiac and socially threatening distractors) 
were compared with RT for neutral distractors thus creating 
an interference index for both socially-threatening and
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Table 11
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Figure 1
Interference Indices for Cardiac and 
Socially Threatening Distractors
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cardiac distractors. The only significant contrast was 
between socially-threatening and neutral distractors for 
high trait-anxious subjects. Although no other contrasts 
were significant, RT to socially threatening distractors 
actually was faster than RT to neutral distractors for low 
trait-anxious subjects.
To investigate the interaction between Word type and 
Cardiac Concern group, RTs to cardiac and social 
distractors were again compared with RT to neutral 
distractors for both high and low cardiac concern subjects. 
Using these procedures, no contrasts proved significant. 
However, as presented in Figure 1, inspection of 
interference indices suggests that high cardiac concern 
subjects, but not low cardiac concern subjects, show faster 
RT to cardiac distractors than to neutral distractors. RT 
to socially-threatening distractors was comparable for both 
groups.
When CES-D or state anxiety scores were used to create 
the Negative Emotionality factor, an identical pattern of 
results emerged for control subjects, and therefore, these 
analyses will not be presented in detail. For MI subjects 
a similar but not duplicate pattern was present. 
Consequently a brief presentation of the analyses will 
follow.
When state anxiety scores were used to create the 
Negative Emotionality factor, a non-significant effect
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emerged for Word type, F(2,60) = 2.80, £ < .07. When CES-D 
scores were used to create the Negative Emotionality 
factor, the effect for Word type again proved significant, 
F(2,60) = 5.68, £ < .005. Post hoc contrasts followed the
same pattern as described previously. Additionally, the 
use of CES-D scores produced an interaction between CCQ 
group, CES-D group, and Word type, F(2,60) = 4.5, £ < .02. 
Inspection of the means presented in Table 13 suggests that 
RTs to cardiac and social distractors were slower than RTs 
to neutral for MI subjects reporting high levels of 
depression but low levels of cardiac concern. However, 
because only five subjects were included in this cell and 
because this interaction did not emerge in other analyses, 
the finding is viewed as unreliable.
In sum, the results for the control subjects is 
comparable for all measures of negative emotionality. 
Individuals reporting high levels of depression, trait- 
anxiety, or state-anxiety show an attentional bias toward 
socially-threatening words. For control subjects reporting 
high levels of cardiac concern, presence of cardiac 
distractors was associated with RT speeding when compared 
with subjects reporting low cardiac concern. A different 
pattern emerged for MI subjects. A review of the data 
suggests that compared with neutral distractors, RTs were 
slower for social threat words, and RT means for cardiac 
and social threat words were equivalent.
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Table 13
Cardiac Concern Group, and Depression Group (Median Split
of CES-D Scores Were Used to Create Two Groups)
MI SUBJECTS
High Depression Low Depression
High CCQ Low CCQ High CCQ Low CCQ
(n=12) (n = 5 ) (n = 5 ) (n=12 )
Word type
Cardiac 896 941 1016 1005
Social Threat 918 931 1006 1 001
Neutral 900 863 990 1002
DISCUSSION
Summary of Main Findings
The self-report data showed MI subjects reported 
higher levels of depressive symptoms and cardiac concern 
than controls. However, on measures of state anxiety, 
trait anxiety, and desire to seek information, no 
differences were found for MI and control subjects. Means 
for all measures of emotional distress were within normal 
range for both MI and control subjects.
Based on the data collected from the attentional 
search task, MI patients did not show specific interference 
effects from cardiac stimuli. When the data from MI 
subjects were analyzed separately, RT to socially 
threatening distractors were slower than RT to neutral 
distractors. Additionally, no differences were found 
between RT to cardiac and socially threatening distractors, 
suggesting that specific attentional biases to cardiac 
stimuli did not emerge after an MI.
For control subjects RT latencies appeared moderated 
by negative emotionality and cardiac concern level.
Subjects reporting high levels of depression/anxiety showed 
longer RT latencies when socially-threatening words were 
present then when neutral distractors were shown. A 
unexpected effect for control subjects was an interaction 
between distractor type and cardiac concern level. An 
inspection of the interference indices for both cardiac and
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social threat suggested high cardiac concern subjects 
showed faster RT latencies when heart-related distractors 
were present.
When bell rings were the dependent variable, subjects 
instructed to suppress thoughts about their hearts reported 
fewer cardiac-related thoughts than those instructed to 
think about anything at all. During the second thought 
monitoring period involving free thought, MI subjects 
experienced more cardiac-related thoughts than control 
subjects. Finally, the hypothesis that suppressing heart- 
related thoughts would later increase attention toward 
cardiac stimuli was unsupported.
Attention to Threat
The attentional search procedures used in this study 
required a subject to identify a target word presented 
simultaneously with two distracting words. As previously 
described, three distractor categories were used, and the 
dependent variable of interest was the subject's RT 
latency. It was assumed that if RT latency was greater for 
certain distractors, the interference in performance would 
be due to the attention capturing properties of the 
distracting stimuli. Alternative hypotheses suggest RT 
delay for certain distractors could be due to competition 
for priority between target word and distractor during 
later processing stages. While it is recognized that 
attentional capture is only one possible explanation for
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interfering effects, other investigators have suggested it 
is the most likely mechanism (Mathews, 1993). Therefore, 
throughout this discussion the terms "attentional bias" and 
"interfering effects" will be used interchangeably, 
although other explanations may in fact be correct.
Personal relevance and threat specificity. It was 
hypothesized that following a major stress such as an MI, 
only threat information relevant to the stressor would 
capture attention. The regression equation computed to 
predict cardiac threat showed MI subjects displaying 
greater interference from cardiac distractors than control 
subjects. However, the analysis of variance indicates MI 
subjects attend equally to social and cardiac distractors. 
This suggests MI patients may develop a general bias toward 
threatening information.
Why did MI subjects display a general interference 
effect for threatening stimuli? One contributing factor 
could be that emotionally disordered subjects were excluded 
from this study. In fact, CES-D, STAI-T, and STAI-S means 
indicated the MI subjects in this study were in the normal 
range of emotional functioning. A review of the literature 
suggests threat specificity is more common in anxiety 
disordered populations than in non-psychiatric, anxious 
controls. Logan and Goetsch (1993) concluded in their 
literature review that the majority of studies involving 
anxiety disordered patients found specific attentional
biases; that is, patients attended to stimuli associated 
with their main area of concern. For example, spider 
phobics attended to information relevant to spiders (Watts, 
et al., 1986) and PTSD rape victims attend to assault- 
related cues (Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy,
1990). However, in investigations of non-psychiatric 
subjects, only a few studies found threat specificity.
Most studies involving analogue populations have found 
similar attention capturing effects for threat-relevant and 
threat-irrelevant stimuli (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg, 
Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 1990).
The finding that no differences were found between RT 
means of cardiac-relevant and cardiac-irrelevant threat 
cues for MI subjects is consistent with the attention 
literature on non-psychiatric subjects. It was 
hypothesized MI subjects would show distinct attentional 
biases to cardiac cues because of negative emotion and 
specific worry about future cardiac problems. However, the 
data suggested MI subjects attended to threat but failed to 
discriminate between different threatening cues.
Control subjects showed some evidence of an 
attentional response specificity. Subjects reporting high 
levels of concern showed RT speeding to cardiac, but not 
socially threatening, distractors. This unexpected finding 
raises questions regarding the processing of threatening 
information in subjects not selected based on emotional
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state. Although the literature reviewed involved either 
anxiety disordered or analogue populations, data from two 
studies using non-psychiatric subjects augment the current 
finding that normal subjects may actually avoid threatening 
information.
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) investigated the influence 
of a stressor, taking an exam, on high and low trait- 
anxious students. All subjects participated in an 
attentional search task requiring them to detect a probe 
that was preceded either by a neutral word or exam-related 
word. Subjects were tested on two occasions; six weeks and 
one week before an examining period (ie., final exams). 
During the first testing period, no word type or group 
differences were found. However, when the examination 
period was one week away, a trait-anxiety and word type 
interaction emerged. The results indicated high trait- 
anxious students would attend to exam-related words, while 
low trait-anxious students would avoid these same stimuli. 
Using a color-naming task in place of the dot-probe 
paradigm, MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) found high and low 
trait-anxious students avoided exam-related cues when an 
exam was to occur within a week. When tested under low- 
stress (non-examination) periods, subjects showed no 
differences in RT between exam and non-exam words.
The findings from this current study are in many ways 
comparable to the two experiments just described. When
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heart related topics are viewed as threatening, control 
subjects avoid the threat cues. This suggests normal 
controls show an inattention to personally-relevant, 
threatening information.
Although cardiac concern was associated with faster RT 
for control subjects, this measure failed to predict RT 
latencies for MI subjects. It had been predicted that 
cardiac concern level would be associated with longer RT 
latencies for cardiac distractors. Therefore, a discussion 
of the findings should include reasons we failed to find 
either enhancing or interfering effects associated with 
cardiac concern level for MI subjects. One possible 
explanation is that the CCQ measured different constructs 
in the MI and control samples. Inspection of the 
correlation matrices for the two groups shows the CCQ was 
significantly correlated with measures of emotional 
distress for MI subjects but not controls. It is 
conceivable that the failure to find a relationship between 
cardiac threat interference and the CCQ is because the CCQ 
was not a pure measure of cardiac concern for MI subjects, 
but instead functioned as a rather imprecise measure of 
distress.
Other explanations that need to be accounted for 
include the possibility of either a ceiling effect or a 
restricted range of CCQ scores for MI patients. Although 
the distribution of CCQ scores appears normal for both MI
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and control subjects, the level of cardiac concern was 
significantly higher for MI than control subjects, and the 
effect size for this difference was fairly large (.31).
This effect size is evident in an analysis of the 
distributions; only one control subject had a CCQ score 
higher than the mean CCQ score for MI subjects, and eighty- 
five percent of the MI subjects had CCQ scores higher than 
the mean CCQ score for controls. Because such a large 
disparity in CCQ scores exists between the two populations, 
the possibility of a ceiling effect remains. It can be 
argued that if cardiac concern had been activated to a 
ceiling level in MI subjects, no true variability existed 
in actual cardiac concern despite fluctuations in CCQ 
scores.
Influence of emotional state on threat cues. The 
results from this study suggest negative emotionality is 
associated with slower RT when social threat distractors 
are displayed, this effect being present for both MI and 
control subjects. When median splits were conducted on 
measures of emotional distress, a distress level by Word 
type interaction was found for control but not MI subjects. 
However, when measures of distress were not dichotomized, 
both depression and anxiety scores were positively 
associated interference from socially-threatening 
distractors for MI subjects. These findings suggest
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heightened levels of emotional distress is associated with 
an attentional bias to socially threatening information.
As indicated in the post-hoc contrasts and the 
correlation between distress measures and interference 
indices, depression and anxiety showed a stronger 
relationship with RT latencies for socially threatening 
than cardiac distractors. In a previous study using 
socially-threatening distractors, Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, 
and Dombeck ( 1 990 ) used a Stroop paradigm to investigate 
differences in color-naming latencies in socially-phobic 
and panic patients. Social phobics, but not panic 
patients, displayed longer response latencies when social 
threats were used. Similar effects were found with 
generalized anxiety patients who worried about social 
issues (Mogg, et al., 1989). These findings, however, 
contrast with a number of other studies involving both 
generally anxious patients and anxious non-patients showing 
no specificity for socially threatening stimuli (MacLeod, 
et al., 1986; Mathews et al., 1990; Mogg & Marden, 1990).
In this study it is difficult to determine if general 
emotional distress is associated exclusively with social 
threat interference because cardiac and social threat 
distractor categories were not matched on threat level. 
Although untested, it is likely that the words used as 
socially threatening distractors were generally more 
threatening than cardiac words. For example, words such as
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"heart" and "vein" do not generally carry the same 
threatening connotation as do the social threat words such 
as "idiot" or "ugly". It is possible that physical 
distractors equal in threat to social distractors, would 
also cause interference in emotionally distressed subjects. 
An additional possibility is that socially threatening 
words were considered more emotional, leading to the 
apparent RT specificity to socially threatening distractors 
for distressed subjects (Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991).
State versus trait influences on attention. A 
question that is ubiquitous throughout the attentional 
literature is whether the variable key to explaining 
attention biases to threat is the current emotional state 
or more enduring cognitive characteristics of anxious 
subjects. Unfortunately, the results of this study provide 
little support for either position. Measures of state and 
trait anxiety were highly correlated with each other, and 
both significantly predicted interference to socially 
threatening distractors. Therefore, in this study it is 
difficult to determine if selectively processing 
threatening information is a function of a transient mood 
state or a more enduring characteristic.
However, a general bias in attending to both cardiac 
and social threat distractors was found for all MI 
patients. For control subjects, a main effect for word 
type failed to emerge, and biases to social threat were
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moderated by anxiety level. It was assumed that after 
experiencing an MI, cardiac patients would report higher 
distress levels than controls. The two groups differed in 
depressive symptomology, and therefore, the general threat 
bias found in MI subjects could potentially be accounted 
for by differences in distress.
This explanation, however, is not supported by the 
finding that the CES-D scores for MI subjects did not 
significantly differ from CES-D standardization norms.
Also, the results from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
suggest that MI and control subjects possessed comparable 
levels of state and trait anxiety. Previous experiments 
have found attentional biases are more commonly associated 
with anxious as opposed to depressed mood (MacLeod, et al., 
1986). Therefore, the general bias found for MI subjects 
may not be due to increased negative emotionality. An 
alternative explanation is that the experience of a severe 
trauma automatically increases allocation of cognitive 
resources to threat. This bias to general threat could be 
a universal reaction to severe stress, emerging even in 
individuals who report being able to effectively cope with 
the stressor.
Anxious or depressed mood: Does it matter? In an 
earlier study investigating the differing relationship of 
depressed mood and anxious mood with attentional biases, 
MacLeod et al. (1986) found that clinically anxious
subjects, but not depressed ones, attend to threat cues. 
However, more recent investigations suggest depressives may 
also show an attentional bias to socially threatening 
information (Mogg & Mathews, unpublished; Williamson, 
personal communication). In the current study, both 
depression and anxiety scores were correlated with 
interference from socially threatening cues. Strong inter­
correlations were found between the STAI and CES-D such 
that the relationship between CES-D and either STAI-T or 
STAI-S was comparable to the correlation between STAI-T and 
STAI-S. This pattern of results suggests the scales were 
most likely a measure of distress, involving both depressed 
and anxious mood states (Orme, et al., 1986). Because the 
scales were so highly inter-correlated, it is difficult to 
determine if depression and anxiety had differing 
influences on attention. Therefore, a minimally 
inferential conclusion drawn from this data is that 
negative emotionality is associated with attention to 
social threat.
Automatic versus controlled processes. The paradigm 
used in this study included only presentation of 
supraliminal stimuli, thereby making issues of automaticity 
difficult to assess. However, the unexpected finding that 
CCQ scores were negatively associated with cardiac threat 
interference parallels with the recent findings of MacLeod 
and Rutherford (1992). These authors found when an
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experimental session was conducted in close temporal 
proximity to an exam, students showed quicker RT latencies 
in a Stroop task involving exam-related words. However, if 
the words in this task were presented at a subliminal 
threshold, high trait-anxious students displayed longer 
response time latencies. The conclusion reached in this 
article was that when subjects were aware of the words, 
high anxious subjects used effortful processes to inhibit 
interference from threat cues, thus leading to speeding.
It is possible that same explanation can account for 
the negative relationship between RT latency to cardiac 
stimuli and cardiac concern level for control subjects. 
Participants most likely possessed some awareness of the 
distracting stimuli, and controlled process could have been 
used to avoid material considered threatening. 
Unfortunately, subliminal presentation of stimuli was not 
included in the procedures, and therefore, a direct 
comparison with the data from MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) 
cannot be made.
Influence of Suppression Instructions
Instructions either to avoid thoughts of one's heart 
or to think of anything were included to test the impact of 
suppressing threatening thoughts. It was hypothesized 
subjects instructed to suppress would later show an 
increase in reported number of heart-related thoughts and
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in attention directed to cardiac cues. The results of the 
study failed to support either hypothesis.
Did subjects suppress? An initial question to be 
addressed is whether subjects were able to suppress heart 
related information. Previous studies have shown that if 
subjects are instructed to suppress a particular topic, 
they will report fewer thoughts of this topic than those 
instructed to think anything at all (Clark, Winton, &
Thynn, 1993). A review of the means presented on Table 10 
shows that in this study subjects instructed not to think 
about their heart had fewer bell rings than subjects 
instructed to think of anything. This finding indicates 
that based on self-report of thought frequency subjects who 
were directed to suppress were at least partially 
successful in complying with the manipulation instructions.
Did "rebound" occur? Wegner et al. (1987) also found 
that subjects instructed to suppress a particular topic 
reported fewer thoughts of the forbidden topic. 
Additionally, these same subjects who initially suppressed 
later experienced an increase in the thoughts they had been 
previously asked not to think about. This phenomenon was 
coined "rebound" and was characterized by increased 
experience of previously suppressed thoughts to a level 
above that found when no suppression instructions were 
given. No evidence for rebound was found in the current 
study. Although a significant interaction emerged between
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thought period and suppression group, a review of the means 
shows that the number of heart related thoughts were 
comparable for both suppression conditions during the 
second heart monitoring period (See Table 10).
Although rebound phenomenon has been reported in a 
number of studies, other investigations have not found this 
effect (Mathews, unpublished; Merckelbach, et al., 1991; 
Muris, Merckelbach, van den Hout, and de Jong, 1992). The 
current failure to replicate could be due either to the 
unstable nature of the rebound phenomenon or because of 
subtle changes in the design necessary for this experiment. 
In all other studies, the second period of thought 
monitoring immediately followed the suppression 
manipulation. In this study, the second thought monitoring 
period followed an attentional search task that lasted 
approximately five minutes. If enhancement of previously 
suppressed thoughts decays rapidly over time, this design 
would not be sensitive to the rebound phenomenon.
Effect of personal relevance on thought decay. In 
this study an interaction between MI group and Session was 
found showing controls reported a slight decrease in 
thoughts from Period 1 to Period 2 while cardiac thought 
frequency for MI subjects increased across time. It is 
important to remember that when Suppression group was 
included as a factor, the 3-way interaction did not reach 
significance, and therefore, the data reported in Table 10
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are collapsed across Suppression condition. As described 
in the Results section, post-hoc contrasts indicate bell 
rings during Period 2 differed between MI subjects and 
controls. No other contrasts proved significant.
There are at least two interpretations of this 
interaction. One explanation is that MI subjects do not 
show a decay in cardiac thought frequency across time, and 
thoughts of one's heart may increase somewhat. This 
differs with the effect found for control subjects where 
the number of thoughts slightly decreased from Period 1 to 
Period 2. An alternative and equally plausible explanation 
is that MI subjects merely have more heart related thoughts 
than control subjects. In Period 1 half the subjects were 
instructed to suppress while the other half thought about 
anything. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret the 
meaning of these scores that were combined across both 
suppression conditions. However, in Period 2 all subjects 
were instructed to think about anything at all, and this 
period gives a purer measure of how frequently one will 
experience a cardiac thought after that topic is mentioned. 
Conclusions and Future Directions
Synopsis of the findings. The aim of this study was 
threefold: to investigate the impact of an MI on 
attentional processes, to investigate the influence of 
potentially moderating variables such as mood state, level 
of cardiac concern, and coping style on attentional
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processes, and to investigate the influence of intentional 
efforts to suppress threatening thoughts. The results of 
this study suggest, though not unequivocally, that MI 
subjects show a general tendency to attend to threatening 
information. In terms of moderating influences on 
attention, the subject's level of depression and anxiety 
predicted RT latency to socially threatening distractors.
In other words, greater negative emotionality was 
associated with attention being directed toward socially 
threatening stimuli. For control subjects, cardiac concern 
level was also associated with RT latencies for cardiac 
distractors, but the influence on attention was in an 
unexpected direction. Specifically, subjects high in 
cardiac concern showed RT speeding when heart-related 
distractors were present suggesting these subjects avoided 
the threatening stimuli. Finally, subjects who were 
instructed to suppress thoughts about their heart did 
report fewer heart related thoughts than subjects 
instructed to think about anything at all.
Unsupported hypotheses. It may also be important to 
discuss those hypotheses that received little support in 
this study. Contrary to prediction, MI subjects did not 
show specific attentional biases toward cardiac threat cues 
although the study possessed power adequate to find such an 
effect (power = .86, assuming a medium effect size). This 
finding could reflect the true attentional reactions that
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develop after an MI, but the failure to support the 
hypotheses also could be a function of methods used to 
measure attention. As presented in Table 6, the standard 
deviations for RT data was quite high, and this inter­
subject variability could account partially for the failure 
to find group differences.
However, previous research investigating less severe 
stressors suggests high stress subjects show attentional 
bias to both threat-relevant and irrelevant distractors 
(Mogg et al., 1990). In the only other investigation of 
attentional effects of a severe stressor, Foa et al (1990) 
studied Stroop latencies for rape victims who had developed 
PTSD and those who had not. The authors found only those 
women with PTSD showed longer response latencies to rape 
related words. Currently, there is little evidence to 
indicate that attentional biases to specific threat stimuli 
occur in non-psychiatric populations, but non-specific 
threat biases have been found for subjects who have 
recently experienced stress.
Another unsupported hypothesis was that subjects' 
level of cardiac concern would be positively associated 
with interference from cardiac stimuli. Measures of 
cardiac concern were negatively correlated with cardiac 
threat interference for control subjects, but no 
relationship was found between level of cardiac concern and 
cardiac threat interference for MI subjects. As previously
discussed, there are some concerns that the CCQ did not 
adequately measure the cardiac concern construct for MI 
subjects. Two possible reasons this construct was measured 
imprecisely for MI subjects include: (1) depression and
anxiety may have factored heavily into the CCQ for MI 
subjects but not controls, and (2) true cardiac concern was 
activated to a ceiling level for MI subjects in spite of 
apparent variability in CCQ scores.
Also absent in this study is any indication that 
suppression of heart-related thoughts paradoxically 
increased attention to cardiac cues in the period following 
suppression. This finding contrasts with results of Wegner 
and Erber (1992) who found increased interference during a 
Stroop task on topics that were suppressed. Although there 
are a number of methodological dissimilarities between this 
current study and Wegner and Erber (1992), two differing 
procedures are most likely the source of the discrepant 
findings. In the study by Wegner and Erber (1992) subjects 
performed the Stroop task while simultaneously suppressing 
a particular topic. In the current study, the attentional 
search task was conducted after the suppression period, and 
subjects were explicitly informed that they were no longer 
required to suppress. Additionally, Wegner and Erber 
(1992) only found longer RT latencies when a cognitive load 
condition (memorization of a 9-digit number) was included 
in the procedures. Therefore, findings from an other
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experiment suggest suppression may increase attention 
directed to the suppressed topic, but only during active 
attempts to suppress. In the current study, no support was 
found to indicate attention is directed toward the 
suppressed topic after the subject ceases suppressing.
Finally, one aim of this study was to investigate the 
hypothesis that self-report measures of coping style would 
be associated with measures of attention to threat. No 
evidence was found to support this prediction. The coping 
style scale in this study provided a self-report measure of 
an individual's preference to attend to (monitoring) or 
avoid (blunting) a stressor. Although for MI subjects, 
monitoring was positively correlated with cardiac threat 
interference, this relationship failed to reach 
significance. Also, no relationship was found between 
monitoring style and social threat interference when the 
responses for all subjects were considered (See Table 3). 
Other self-report measures, notably measures of cardiac 
concern and emotional distress, were shown to significantly 
influence attentional responses. This suggests that if 
self-report of coping style does influence attentional 
processes, its moderating effect is modest.
Implications for MI patients. This study has few 
implications for counseling individuals who experienced an 
MI. Although MI subjects were slightly more distressed 
than age-matched controls, the level of depressive
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symptomology was in the normal range. Not surprisingly, 
level of cardiac concern was elevated for MI patients, and 
greater concern was associated with increased anxiety 
levels. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the 
causal nature of this relationship as negative mood state 
may produce worry about one's heart, or conversely worry 
about one's cardiac state may lead to anxiety.
As previously discussed there is some evidence 
suggesting MI subjects showed a general attentional bias to 
threat information. A recent study by MacLeod and Hagan 
(1992) found that RT latency to threat in a subliminal 
Stroop task later predicted emotional state in women who 
were diagnosed with cervical pathology. A strong 
relationship remained intact even after effects of mood 
state prior to diagnosis were partialled out. These 
findings suggest that MI subjects may be vulnerable to 
developing emotional difficulties if further stressors are 
encountered.
Future directions. A growing body of literature is 
indicating that normal subjects may avoid information 
considered threatening. As was present in this study and 
in an experiment by MacLeod and Rutherford (1992), the RT 
for normal subjects quickened when threat information was 
presented supraliminally. MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) 
furthermore found that when the stimuli was presented 
subliminally, attention to threat was found in high anxious
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subjects. The disparity between sub- and supraliminal 
presentation implies controlled processes may operate in 
normals such that feared information is avoided. However, 
if control processes are impaired due to presentation of 
stimuli without complete awareness, more automatic 
reactions to the threat may occur.
It has been suggested that the difference between high 
anxious normals and anxiety disordered patients is that 
high anxious normals still possess resources to deal with 
presentation of threatening information (Mathews, 1993).
In clinical patients, however, the availability of 
resources to cope with stressors is limited. So, while 
normals possess the resources to avoid threat cues, 
clinical patients attend to threatening stimuli.
Attention to threat also can be shown in normals if 
the controlled process are restricted by some artificial 
means. Following this line of reasoning, control subjects 
who report high levels of cardiac concern may actually show 
attentional biases to heart cues if procedures used to 
restrict the controlled resources were included. Two 
procedural changes that could possibly address this issue 
would be either introduction of a cognitive load 
requirement or subliminal presentation of the stimuli. If 
cardiac threat interference was found using this modified 
presentation, this would argue that active attempts were 
being made to avoid the threat cues.
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Conclusions. The main predictions of this study were 
not supported. Namely, MI patients did not show specific 
attentional biases to cardiac distractors nor did 
suppression increase attention directed to the suppressed 
topic. However, a number of interesting findings did 
emerge. First of all, there was some indication that MI 
subjects attended both to social and cardiac distractors 
more than neutral distractors. Secondly, cardiac concern 
level was associated with RT speeding when cardiac 
distractors were present. Finally, emotional distress was 
associated with longer RT latencies for socially- 
threatening distractors.
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Race: Black White Other
Mafital Status: Single Married Divorced
Highest Level of Education Completed:
_____ some high school
_____ high school graduate
  technical school
 ___  some college/university
  college graduate
_____ graduate/professional school
Are you currently being seen by a psychologist, psychiatrist or 
another mental health specialist? ____  Yes   No





Louisiana State University Medical Center
I, ____________ _____ i______ (print name), freely and willingly
consent to participate in a research project investigating 
psychological reactions to information related to heart disease. 
The study is being conducted by Joseph I. Constans, M.S. and 
Taryn James, graduate students at Louisiana State University, and 
supervised by Dr. Phillip J. Brantley at Louisiana State 
University Medical Center.
As a research subject, I understand that I will be required to 
complete questionnaires (measures of mood, coping style, and 
level of concern regarding heart functioning) and a demographic 
questionnaire. I also agree, if asked, to allow my physician to 
provide a rating of current cardiac functioning. In addition, I 
agree to complete a 20 minute computer experiment which will 
assess potential attentional biases.
I understand that all the information that I will provide in this 
experiment will be strictly confidential and will not appear in 
my medical chart. If the results of this study are published, I 
understand that my name will not be used nor will any information 
be identified with me personally. I also understand that I may 
choose to decline to participate or withdraw from this study 
without any penalty. In no way will my medical treatment be 
affected by my decision not to participate in this study.
All my questions concerning this study have been answered. I 
understand that I have the right to be provided with answers to 
questions which may arise during the course of this study. I 
understand that I have the right to contact, Dr. Phillip J. 
Brantley at 358-1105 if any concerns about this experiment arise. 
I have read and understand this consent form. I acknowledge 
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DIRECTIONS: This questionnaire is designed to assess the degree to vfriich you think about 
the functioning of your heart. Specifically, we are interested in getting a measure of 
how concerned you are about your heart and potential heart related problems. In order to 
assess your level of concern, we have developed this questionnaire consisting of 14 items. 
For the following items, please read each question carefully and then use the following 
rating scale to respond to the question.
If you will look at the rating scale printed below, you will see that the scale ranges 
from 0 to 8. At various points along the scale, there ar certain words printed to help 
you understand what each number represents. Please review this scale carefully and ask 
the experimenter to explain it to you if you do not understand. After reviewing the 
scale, begin answering the items. Remember, you can use any number from 0 to 8 to respond 
to the questions.
0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8I------1------- ,-------,------- 1-------,------- 1-------,------ ,
Never Seldom Occasionally Frequently Always
1) How often do you worry about having (or having another) heart attack?
2) How often do you think or worry about either currently diagnosed heart 
disease or the possibility of developing heart disease?
3) How often do you talk about heart disease?
4) How often do you become emotionally upset when thinking about problems or
potential problems with your heart?
5) How often do you experience fear or anxiety when you have chest pain, 
shortness of breath, or a strong or irregular heart beat?
6) How often do you worry about heart disease affecting possibly affecting 
your sexual functioning?
7) How often do you worry about heart related problems affecting your job?
8) How often do you worry about heart related problems affecting your hobbies?
9) How often do you worry about heart disease affecting your relationships 
with other people?
10) How often do you check your pulse?
11) How often so you check yourself for an irregular pattern of heart beating?
12) How often do you feel that you are extra-sensitive to your heart functioning?
13) How often do you experience chest pain or irregular heart beats?
14) How'often do you experience shortness of breath?
APPENDIX F
CENTER FOR EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDY - DEPRESSION SCALE
119
120
Name:_____________________________Date:__________Age:____ Sex: Male Female
I
CES-D
INSTRUCTIONS: On the line, place the number of the statement which best
describes how often you felt this way DURING THE PAST WEEK.
e 1 2 3
Rarely or none Some or little Occasionally or a Most or all
of the time of the tiae moderate amount of of the tiae
(less than 1 day) (1 to 2 days) time ( 3 to 4 days) (5 to 7 days)
1. I was bothered by thingp that usually don't bother me. *e 2 3
2. I did not feel like eating; ay appetite was poor......... 2 3
3. 1 felt that I could not shake off the blues even with
help from my family or friends............ 2 3
4. 1 felt that I was just as good as other people........... .6 2 3
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what 1 was doing* .0 2 3
6. 1 felt depressed................................. 2 3
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort........ 2 3
8. 1 felt hopeful about the future.................. 2 3
9. 1 thought my life had been a failure............. 2 3
18. 1 felt fearful.................................. 2 3
11. My sleep was restless................... 2 3
12. 1 was happy............................ 2 3
13. I talked less than usual......... ...... 2 3
14. 2 felt lonely. ......................... 2 3
15. People were unfriendly.................. 2 3
16. I enjoyed life............................. 2 3
17. I had crying spells........................ 2 3
18. 1 felt sad................................ 2 3
19. I felt that people disliked me.......... 2 3
28. I could not get ’going*.................... 2 3
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